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In recent months the spectre of a serious international trade war
has receded. The major financial nations have reached fundamental
agreement on realigning the world's currency relationships;' the United
States has removed the ten percent import surcharge2 and the "Buy
American" clause of the investment tax credit;3 a textile agreement has
been completed between the United States and Japan;4 and Americans
and Europeans are engaged in serious discussions over further trade
liberalization. 5 These developments have been accompanied by up-
heavals in traditional thinking about the structure of the pillar institu-
tions of the international economy. The International Monetary Fund
Agreement6 has become almost a relic overnight,7 and there is talk
1 See N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1971, at 1, col. 8.2 Pres. Proc. No. 4098, 36 Fed. Reg. 24,201 (1971), repealing Pres. Proc. No. 4074,
36 Fed. Reg. 15,724 (1971) (imposing surcharge).
3 Revenue Act of 1971, § 103, Pub. L. No. 92-178 (Dec. 10, 1971).
4 See N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1971, at 1, col. 8.
5 See, e.g., id., Feb. 12, 1972, at 1, col. 2; id., Feb. 2, 1972, at 51, col. 5; id., Dec. 22, 1971,
at 51, col. 2; id., Nov. 26, 1971, at 59, col. 1.
6 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat.
1401, TJ.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 29 (1947). The agreement seeks to stabilize the world's
currency relationships through a system of fixed exchange rates and a fund of exchange
reserves from which loans are made to countries experiencing balance of payments diffi-
culties. See generally H. Aursucirr, TsE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (1964); J. GoLD,
THE INTERNATIONAL MONrARY FUND AND INTERNATONAL LAw (1965); H. STEINER & D.
VAGrs, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PaoaLzms 1101-43 (1968).
7 A fixed value for the dollar and its free convertibility into gold were implicit as-
sumptions of the present system. The United States decision to suspend convertibility of
the dollar into gold (see N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1971, at 1, col. 4), and its ultimate decision
to devalue the dollar (see id., Dec. 15, 1971, at 1, col. 8), violated these assump-
tions and undermined the dollar's role as a reserve currency. In truth, the monetary
crisis which erupted after these radical American moves had been brewing for several
years beginning at least with the devaluation of the pound sterling in the winter of 1967.See generally 2 A. CsuyEs, T. EumncH & A. LowENmD, ImmEATIONAL LEGAL PRocrss
1972]
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of reformulating the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).8 Now that a trade war has been averted there is hopefully
an opportunity to press forward towards more liberalized and expanded
world trade in the context of either partially or thoroughly reformu-
lated international economic institutions. This article is concerned
with one aspect of the trade problem: antidumping laws.
"Dumping" refers to the practice of selling goods in an export
market at prices below those prevailing in.the home market. It is a
form of international price discriminationi. From the turn of the
century to the 1950's the international trading community uniformly
regarded dumping as a distortion of natural trade patterns. Conse-
quently, the nations of the Western trading world and Japan have all
enacted antidumping laws which assess a special duty against dumped
goods. The duty is generally designed to raise the dumping price to the
level of home market sales and is imposed in addition to regular tariffs.
It is my thesis that antidumping laws are potentially far more distortive
of trade patterns than the practice they were designed to deter.9
705-804 (1969). Changes in the present agreement that have been suggested for coping
with the new parameters of international finance include: (1) new rules to facilitate
necessary changes in the exchange rates of both surplus and deficit countries; (2) greater
exchange rate flexibility through wider margins of permitted fluctuation around parity;
and (3) substitution of special drawing rights (SDR's) for gold as the standard against
which currencies are valued and as the regulator of international liquidity. See 23 INT'L
FIN. NEws SURVEY 388-90 (1971); see also INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, SUMMsAlRY
PROCEmINGS: ANNUAL MEETING (1971).
8 Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pt. 5, at All, T.IA.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1950) [here-
inafter cited as GATT].
The GATT is a multilateral agreement governing national action in trade policy
matters. See generally K. DAM, THE GATT-Iwv AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOIC ORGANI-
ZATION (1970); J. JACKSON, WoRLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969); H. SmNER & D.
VAGTS, supra note 6, at 1046-89. For a discussion of the problems of GATT and suggestions
for its reformulation emanating from the executive branch, see the summary recommen-
dations of the President's Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy
(COMMISSION ON INTL TRADE & INV. PoLIcY, UNITD STATES INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD (1971)) and the special report of Peter G. Peterson,
Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs (see N.Y. Times, Dec. 80,
1971, at 1, col. 1; id. at 34, col. 1). See generally, Hudec, GATT or GABB? The Future
Design of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 80 YALE LJ. 1299 (1971).
9 There is substantial literature on dumping and antidumping laws. The standard
text is J. VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (reprint ed. 1966) [herein-
after cited as VIm]. This edition also contains Viner's Memorandum on Dumping, written
for the World Economic Conference of the League of Nations (id. at 347), and his article
Dumping, written for the Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (id. at 374).
Legal writers have seldom been willing to undertake the thorough economic analysis of
the underlying evils of dumping necessary to understand why and to what extent the
practice should be regulated. For notable exceptions see Anthony, The American Response
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This article contains four major sections. Section I will examine
the grounds traditionally advanced for opposing dumping in interna-
tional trade, only one of which in my opinion is sound. If it becomes
possible to restructure an international consensus on antidumping
laws, I believe the new rules should reflect thestandards for evaluating
dumping suggested in this section. Section II traces in brief compass
the history of complaints against dumping, the rise of national anti-
dumping laws, and the protectionist potential of these laws. Section III
discusses efforts to curb the protectionism of antidumping laws through
international agreement.10 Section IV discusses implementation of the
International Antidumping Code in the signatory countries, which in-
clude all the Western trading nations and Japan. Implementation of
the Code in the United States is stressed in this section for two reasons:
(1) the United States is the only signatory that has thus far not fully
implemented the Code, as evidenced by the recent anti-Code injury
decisions of the Tariff Commission," and (2) American implementation
to Dumping from Capitalist and Socialist Economies-Substantive Premises and Re-
structured Procedures After the 1967 GATT Code, 54 CoRNELL L. REv. 159 (1969); Note,
The Antidumping Act-Tariff or Antitrust Law?, 74 YALE L.J. 707 (1965). For a discussion
of the economics of dumping somewhat at variance with the analysis in Anthony, supra,
see text accompanying notes 38-51 infra. The question of which are more trade dis-
tortive, dumping or antidumping laws, is discussed thoroughly in K. Dar, supra note
8, at 167-77.
The standard legal essay on the American Antidumping Act is Ehrenhaft, Pro-
tection Against International Price Discrimination: United States Countervailing and
Antidumping Duties, 58 COLUm. L. REv. 44 (1958). For general discussion of the American
Act, see Anthony, supra; Baier, Substantive Interpretations Under the Antidumping Act
and the Foreign Trade Policy of the United States, 17 STAN. L. Rav. 409 (1965); Conner
9. Buschlinger, The United States Antidumping Act: A Timely Survey, 7 VA. J. INT'l- L.
117 (1966); Coudert, The Application of the United States Antidumping Law in the Light
of a Liberal Trade Policy, 65 CoLum. L. Ray. 189 (1965); Davis, The Regulation and
Control of Foreign Trade, 66 COLUm. L. Rxv. 1428, 1438-44 (1966); Feller, The Anti-
dumping Act and the Future of East-West Trade, 66 MIC. L. Ray. 115 (1967); Hendrick,
Administration of the U.S. Antidumping Act-Procedures and Policies, in SENATE FINANCE
COmt., 90re CONG., 2D Sass., COMPENDIUM OF PAPERs ON LEGIsLATIvE OvERSionur Ramva
or UNrIED STATES TRADE POLICIES 156 (Comm. Print 1968) [hereinafter cited as COM-
PENDIuM]; Kohn, The Antidumping Act: Its Administration and Place in American Trade
Policy, 60 Micr. L. REv. 407 (1962); Prosterman, Withholding of Appraisement Under the
United States Antidumping Act: Protectionism or Unfair Competition Law?, 41 WASH.
L. REv. 315 (1966).
10 The most notable attempt to curb protectionism is the International Antidumping
Code, negotiated during the GATT-sponsored Kennedy Round at Geneva from 1964 to
1967. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, opened for signature, June 30, 1967, [1967] 19 U.S.T. 4348, T.IA.S. No. 6431
(effective July 1, 1968) [hereinafter cited as Code]. The Code has been reprinted in 32
Fed. Reg. 14,962 (1967) and in 6 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATm.S 920 (1967).
11 See text accompanying notes 250-317 infra.
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is the key to the Code's success as an effective expression of an interna-
tional consensus on antidumping laws. The United States Treasury, in
determining price discrimination, has implemented the Code in ac-
cordance with the American antidumping statute.12 It is my thesis that
the Tariff Commission, in its injury determinations under the statute,
should do likewise. I believe that Code principles constitute a permissi-
ble, indeed better, interpretation of the statute than the Commission's
recent anti-Code decisions.
The Code, although it falls short of the ideal standards discussed
in section I, is nevertheless an important step forward. Negotiated at
the Kennedy Round in the summer of 1967,13 it is the first attempt at
fashioning substantive and administrative standards to suppress the
protectionist potential of a nontariff trade barrier. Lower duty levels
have been successfully achieved over the years at periodic GATT-
sponsored trade conferences14 through direct negotiations on tariff
schedules. Nontariff barriers are more difficult to control. They gener-
ally involve legitimate internal regulatory schemes, such as domestic
safety regulations, antipollution controls, or taxing policies, which have
restrictive effects on trade.15 The mere proliferation of such regulatory
schemes and the administrative burdens they involve can cause serious
delays in customs clearance. Moreover, as tariff walls have crumbled
nontariff barriers have become more visible and more attractive to
domestic interests seeking protection.'. With the rising need for further
nontariff controls, the Antidumping Code, if successful, could serve as
a model for future negotiations.17
12 Antidumping Act of 1921, ch. 14, tit. II, 42 Stat. 11, as amended, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-71
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Antidumping Act].
18 See note 10 supra.
14 The last and most productive conference was the Kennedy Round. There were four
others: at Annecy, France in 1949; at Torquay, England in 1951; and at Geneva, Switzer-
land in 1956 and 1962 (the "Dillon Round'). See Note, The Trade Act of 1971: A Fun-
damental Change in United States Foreign Trade Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1418, 1428 n.53
(1971).
15 There is growing literature on nontariff trade distortions. See generally R. BALU-
WIN, NoNTARIFF DISTORTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1970); K. DAM, supra note 8, at
180 passim; Kelly, Nontariff Barriers, in STUDIES IN TRADE LiBERALIZATION 265-314 (B.
Balassa ed. 1967); Wilson, Nontariff Barriers to International Trade: A Survey of Current
Problems, 18 J. PuB. L. 403 (1969).
16 T. CURTIS & J. VASTINE, THE KENNEDY ROUND AND TE FUTURE OF AmRCAN TRADE
202 (1971); see also J. EvANs, THE KENNEDY ROUND IN AMERICAN TRADE POLICY: THE Twi-
LIGHT Or GATT? 87-89 (1971).
17 Codes paralleling the Antidumping Code are most likely to be negotiated to deal
with export subsidies and government procurement policies. SPECILL REPREsETATVE FOR
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, FUTURE UNITED STATES FOREIGN TRADE PoLiCY: REPORT TO THE
[Vol. 57:491
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In the final analysis the success of the Code will depend upon ac-
tual, as opposed to formal, consensus. If the United States Tariff Com-
mission persists in its present protectionist, anti-Code posture, it will
be clear that a realistic consensus has not yet developed in the anti-
dumping area, not even at the compromise level represented by the
Code. But there are reasons to hope for change. The Commission's
membership is in constant flux, and membership more than anything
seems to determine the cast of its decisions.' 8 Moreover, one can reason-
ably conclude that many of the dumping complaints recently acted upon
PREsiDENT 18, 20-38 (1969); see Hudec, supra note 8, at 1357 n.147. The GATT has com-
pleted a major study of other nontariff barriers for use in future negotiations. See GATT,
BAsIC INsrauAsxrs AN SELEcrED DocumENTs 69 (15th Supp. 1968); id. at 12, 14 (16th Supp.
1969).
The debate over restructuring GATT has raised the question of whether it should
continue to contain sets of legalistic rules and principles to govern national actors in trade
matters. The alternative would be a looser structure to facilitate pragmatic commercial
bargaining between nations, with stress upon actual trade flows. See Hudec, supra note 8,
at 1302-09. Hudec draws upon two recently published general works on the GAT: K.
DAM, supra note 8; J. JACKSON, supra note 8.
Dissatisfaction with the legalistic approach stems perhaps from the general realiza-
tion that the present GATT rules overstate the existing degree of international consensus
and commitment to nondiscriminatory, liberal trade principles. The suggested alternative
of "nondirective consultative procedures" no doubt reflects the pragmatic view that GATT
has functioned most effectively with such procedures in the past. The term comes from
Hudec, supra note 8, at 1299-1300.
This article assumes the worth and virtue of the rule-making or codification approach,
especially in the area of nontariff trade barriers, where uniform codified standards can be
of paramount importance to private traders who must forecast the regulatory treatment
they can expect to receive at national borders. Moreover, on the broader issue of rules
versus bargaining procedures, I believe there must be a continued role in international
commerce for the "rules of the game." The recent monetary crisis has underscored the
increasing interdependence of the world's separate national economies. Attempts to ex-
port unemployment or to beggar neighboring nations through unilateral economic poli-
des merely invite retaliation and a reduced pie for all. Rules and principles clarify the
bounds within which national actors may pursue national objectives without fear of
retaliation. The primary need is for a more accurately stated and indeed expanded interna-
tional consensus in trade matters. See, e.g., R. COOPER, THE ECONOMCS oF INmRDEPENDENCE
(1968).
In truth the present GATT rules have never been given unconditional binding force
by the contracting parties. Under the Protocol of Provisional Application, 61 Stat. A2051
(1947), 55 U.N.T.S. 308 (1950), the contracting parties were not bound to any provisions
in part II of GATT (arts. III-XXIII) which conflicted with national legislation existing
prior to October 30, 1947. For a general discussion of the Protocol, see J. JAcKsON, supra
note 8, at 60-63. Moreover, the GATT provisions are often either riddled with exceptions
or cast in such general terms as to have no seriously binding content. The Antidumping
Code attempts in the dumping area to remedy some of these defects. It is a binding agree-
ment, and it attempts to elaborate some of the more general concepts in the present GATT
rules. See generally K. DAM, supra note 8; J. JAcKSON, supra note 8.
is See note 323 infra.
1972]
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in the United States were triggered in part by the then existing disparity
in exchange rates and by the American payments imbalance. Because
of the recent crisis-inspired adjustments, the protectionist pressure in
Congress and on the Commission can be expected to subside to some
degree in the future.
I
DUMPING AND A FREE TRADE WORLD ECONOMY
A. Standards for Evaluating Dumping
To assess the alleged evils of dumping in international trade, I
begin with a basic premise: the validity of free trade theory.'19 My
assumption is that world welfare will be promoted if barriers to trade
are reduced and business concerns are encouraged to compete across
national boundaries. There are recognized exceptions to liberal trade
policy, justified mostly by short term considerations. For example, free
trade may be restricted in a country to aid infant industries, to avoid
sudden stress or dislocation in a given sector of a national economy, or
to aid in solving balance of payments problems.20 My inquiry is
whether dumping falls into a similar exceptional category or whether
it is fundamentally inconsistent with free trade objectives. Why should
the United States, for example, levy a special duty on imported Japa-
nese television sets which happen to command a higher price in Japan
than in the United States21 and not on sets which are sold at a uniform
price in both countries?
19 On the basic economics of free trade theory see generally P. SAMU mLSON, ECONOMIcs
621-705 (8th ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as SAMUELSON]. For more advanced treatment of
the subject, see G. HABERLER, A SuRvEY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY (1961) [herein-
after cited as HABERLER, SURVEY]; C. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (4th ed.
1968); 2 J. MEADE, TRADE AND WELFARE (1955). For an excellent concise statement of the
theory of free trade, exceptions to the theory, and the historical development of American
trade policy, with ample cited authority, see Note, supra note 14.
For the economics of dumping in international trade, see generally VINER; see also
G. HABERLER, THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 296-324 (rev. Engl. transl. 1950)
[hereinafter cited as HABERLER, THEORY]; C. KINDLEBERGER, supra at 146-68; 2 J. MEADE,
supra at 244-53; A. PIGou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 284-85, 288-89 (4th ed. 1932); J.
ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPErIION 179-208 (1933); L. YEAGER & D.
TuERcE, TRADE POLICY AND Tim PRICE Sysm 149-54 (1966); de Jong, The Significance of
Dumping in International Trade, 2 J. WORLD TRADE L. 162, 167-72 (1968).
20 For a discussion of the three common exceptions to free trade theory, see Note,
supra note 14, at 1421-24.
21 See Television Receiving Sets, Monochrome & Color, from Japan, 36 Fed. Reg.
4597 (Treas. 1971) (imposing antidumping duty).
[Vol. 57:491
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1. Kinds of Dumping
I shall consider three kinds of dumping, measuring each by the
effect it has on competing producers in the country into which the
dumped goods are shipped: (1) per se price discrimination; (2) injurious
dumping; and (3) predatory dumping. The first category includes dump-
ing which causes only minimal business injury to domestic competitors;
the distinguishing characteristic is per se price discrimination. The
second includes dumping practices which cause recognizable and per-
haps significant business injury in the form of lost sales and lower prof-
its, but of a type normally associated with ordinary price competition
in the marketplace. The third includes dumping practices which by
design or in effect cause such pervasive injury to domestic competition
as to threaten monopolization.
It is part of my thesis that only the last, predatory dumping, is in-
consistent with the objectives of free trade policy. This position is some-
times implied but not often clearly articulated in the legal literature
on dumping.22 On the contrary, condemnation of all injurious dumping
or even per se condemnation of international price discrimination has
often been urged. I shall consider four arguments advanced to support
these latter positions: (1) that dumping represents an unfair trade prac-
tice; (2) that the advantage the dumper appears to possess is "artificial"
and reflects a hidden "subsidy" from monopoly profits in the home
market; (3) that dumping which rests upon monopoly power in the
home market is distortive of resource allocation; and (4) that because
dumping prices are generally impermanent, the short-lived benefits
which inexpensive dumped goods may bring to the consumer do not
outweigh the injury to domestic producers. The unsoundness of these
arguments stems mainly from their overemphasis on cost factors in
pricing decisions-to the neglect of demand2-and from their failure
to appreciate the procompetitive aspects of non-predatory dumping.24
2. The Affinity Between Free Trade and Antitrust Policy
The analysis of dumping which follows rests upon the seldom
stressed affinity between free trade theory and antitrust policy. In the
static terms of comparative advantage, liberal trade doctrine tells us
22 For two of the clearest statements of this position, see Adams & Dirlam, Dumping,
Antitrust Policy and Economic Power, 1966 Bus. Topics 20; Note, supra note 9.
23 See text accompanying notes 59-51 infra.
24 See text accompanying notes 65-77 infra.
1972]
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that total world income will increase if each country specializes in the
production of those goods which, relative to its other production al-
ternatives, it can produce with greatest efficiency. Each country then
meets its other needs by trading its specialized products for those of
other countries. 25 There is also a dynamic side to the free trade argu-
ment, however, which takes into account changes in efficiency over
time.26 Here liberal trade doctrine and antitrust policy overlap. The
latter teaches that competitive rivalry in the marketplace is the most
reliable means, consistent with a free market economy, of achieving
three major dynamic objectives: efficiency in the allocation of produc-
tive resources through time, innovative vigor in the production process,
and distribution of products to the consumer at lowest possible prices.27
Free trade theory merely seeks to achieve these virtues on a global scale
by encouraging competition to spill across national boundaries. Effi-
ciency in the allocation of global resources is thus furthered and prices
are lowered towards a global minimum.28
B. Avoidance of Anticompetitive Predation-The Possibly Valid
Argument Against Dumping
In theory the predatory dumper violates the fundamental desid-
erata of free trade and antitrust policies by carrying competition too far.
The prototype case is that of the powerful foreign monopolist who uses
his monopoly earnings at home to sustain cut-rate prices in the market
under attack. After crippling rivals and driving them to extinction, he
recoups losses through monopoly profits in the newly conquered market.
If seriously followed as a business strategy, such practices would threaten
the competitive process itself.
Antidumping laws designed to ban only this form of dumping are
25 On the benefits of specialization and comparative advantage theory, see SAMUEL-
SON 645-50; see also HABERLER, SURvEY 6-11.
26 See HABERLER, SuRvEY 55.
27 See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958), where the Court
states: "[Tihe unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation
of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality, and the greatest material
progress .... " See also ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NAT'L CoMm. To STUDY THE ANTMUsT LAws,
REPORT 337-38 (1955) thereinafter cited as ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ANTITRUST REPORT]. For
a general discussion of antitrust economics, see F. SCHERER, INDUsRuAL MARKr STRUCTURE
AND ECONOMIC PERXORMANCE (1970) [hereinafter cited as SCHFRER].
28 Free trade objectives are more limited than those of antitrust policy, however,
because natural imperfections are greater in the international than the domestic market.
Factors of production, for example labor, are less mobile internationally than domesti-
cally.
[Vol. 57:491
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analogous to the American domestic anti-price discrimination measures
found in section 2 of the Clayton Act,29 as amended in 1936 by the
Robinson-Patman Act.30 The primary line provisions of these laws
prohibit a domestic supplier from discriminating in price only if such
discrimination threatens monopolization or lessens competition in the
same product line3 1 Competitive or nettlesome price discrimination is
not banned per se.
While antipredation laws are consistent with basic antitrust policy,
there are still reasons to be cautious about their application. Economists
often stress that such laws-particularly anti-price discrimination laws
-may in themselves pose serious and unavoidable danger to the com-
petitive process. If one were to find suppliers who discriminate in price
for proper competitive reasons guilty of lessening competition in cases
where they inflict only ordinary business injury on rival business con-
cerns, all interfirm price rivalry-the essence of business competition-
would be inhibited. 2 The mere existence of anti-price discrimination
laws produces some chilling effect on price competition.
This effect appears particularly unnecessary when it is realized that
the extent of predation in price discrimination practices is often greatly
exaggerated.s A predatory strategy is not totally dependent upon price
discrimination, nor is there any reason to believe that it is a more com-
mon strategy among monopolists. The predator need only have a deep
pocket, which could have resulted from highly profitable but indepen-
dent product lines, past accumulated profits, or the personal wealth of
individual entrepreneurs. More importantly, predatory pricing will
only be effective if it is possible to prevent reentry into the market after
29 Ch. 823, § 2, 88 Stat. 730 (1914).
30 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
31 The statute as it now reads makes price discrimination unlawful
where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or
prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the
benefit of such discrimination ....
Clayton Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970), formerly ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914). For
general discussion of the domestic American price discrimination law, see C. AUSTIN,
PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATmAN Acr (2d rev.
ed. 1959); C. Eow ARs, TlE PRIcE DISCRIMINATION LAw (1959); F. RowE., PRICE DISCRIMI-
NATION UNDER TIE ROBINSON-PATmAN ACT (1962).
32 See ATrONEY GENERAL'S ANTrrRusr REPORT 164-65; C. EnwARs, supra note 31, at
530-31; SCHERER 499; Bowman, Restraint of Trade by the Supreme Court: The Utah Pie
Case, 77 YALE L.J. 70 (1967); Note, Unlawful Primary Line Price Discriminations: Preda.
tory Intent and Competitive Injury, 68 COLUm. L. REv. 137, 140-41 (1968).
33 See Bowman, supra note 32, at 83; McGee, Price Discrimination and Competitive
Effects: The Standard Oil of Indiana Case, 23 U. CHI. L. REv. 398 (1956).
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the attempt is made to charge monopoly prices. There is never any
guarantee that entry barriers will be sufficient. Bankruptcy or plant
shutdown on the part of injured competitors would not eliminate physi-
cal production facilities; these might be reactivated if prices rise. The
monopolist could of course set prices just below the point at which entry
would be encouraged, but it would be difficult to predict this "stay-out"
price in advance and to calculate whether in the long run a predatory
strategy would be worth the cost.
On the international level the predatory strategy raises even
greater difficulties and uncertainties. To succeed, a predatory dumper
must achieve a worldwide monopoly.3 4 It would not be enough to drive
out domestic producers in the market under attack, since the slightest
rise in prices up to or above the world price level would encourage
immediate entry by rival producers in other countries.
Thus there is good reason to doubt the full validity and serious-
ness of even the predatory argument against dumping. I turn now to
arguments which condemn dumping in more sweeping terms and
which are more clearly fallacious. These arguments pose for inter-
national trade even more egregious forms of the competition-inhibiting
dangers inherent in all anti-price discrimination laws.
C. The Invalid Arguments Against Dumping
1. Dumping as an Unfair Trade Practice
Domestic producers and public officials sometimes appear to argue
that price discrimination in international trade should be condemned
per se as an "unfair trade practice" or as "unfair competition."3 5 These
concepts have their origin in tort law where they have been used by
plaintiffs to obtain relief against various deceptive and unscrupulous
business practices such as plagiarism, theft of trade secrets, fake or
deceptively imitative labeling, or disparagement of another enterprise
or product.8 Closely related concepts are recognized in copyright,
patent, and trademark statutes. Allowance of such causes of action
represents an exception to general antitrust policy designed to serve as a
34 But see de Jong, supra note 19, at 171-72.
35 See, e.g., Long, United States Law and the International Anti-dumping Code, 3
INT'L LAW. 464, 467 (1969); American Mining Congress, Declaration of Policy, 1967-68, in
CoMPENDIuM 82. In a number of recent Tariff Commission decisions Commissioner Clubb
has expressed similar views. See text accompanying notes 281-82 infra.
38 See Green, Protection of Trade Relations Under Tort Law, 47 VA. L. REv. 559,
565-66 (1961).
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special inducement to invention and to the careful development of
marketing techniques embodied in a trade name.
No such policy justification underlies the argument for outlawing
all instances of price discrimination. Applied to international trade, the
argument would grant domestic firms a commercial property right in
existing customers or price levels. A domestic producer could apparently
secure relief against a discriminating foreign supplier whenever any
form of business injury-loss of sales or lower profits-justified the
administrative expense of redressing the injury.3 7 Ordinary price
competition would probably result in such injury, and the foreign
supplier, if he is to compete effectively in international commerce,
would frequently be forced to discriminate in price to some degree,
because a competitive price must reflect the local conditions in each
national market. The unfair competition argument, if a valid exception
to liberal trade principles, would seem to be one which wholly swallows
the doctrine.
2. Dumping as an Artificial Advantage-The Subsidy Argument
A second argument attacks low dumping prices because, it is as-
serted, they are not cost justified. Dumping prices are said to be "sub-
sidized" by high monopoly profits in the home market and are thus seen
to reflect an "artificial" rather than a "genuine" competitive advan-
tage.88
a. The Fallacy of Cost-Plus Pricing-The Omission of Demand.
The suggestion here is that only cost-plus pricing is economically de-
fensible.8 9 In this view "genuine" pricing requires a ratable distribution
of variable and fixed costs to each item of production sold in each
market. Costs such as wages and the outlay for raw materials vary
proportionately with the amount of output, whereas fixed costs such as
those attributable to plant machinery and space rental are incurred
irrespective of output. Standard economic theory teaches that variable
costs must be covered in the short run and total costs-variable plus
fixed-in the long run.4 0 Thus a price in the export market above
average variable costs but below average total costs would be seen by
proponents of cost-plus pricing as not bearing its fair share of fixed costs
and hence not genuinely cost justified in the long run. Higher prices in
87 See text accompanying notes 281-82 infra.
38 See Anthony, supra note 9, at 168-77.
39 Cf. Note, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARv. L. RiEv. 69, 241 (1967).
40 See SAMUELSON 441-48.
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the home market would be seen as bearing a disproportionately large
share of the fixed costs and hence as "subsidizing" the export sales.4
This line of argument fails to give proper weight to the demand or
revenue side of pricing decisions.4 It proceeds correctly from the
assumption that profitable price discrimination can only occur when the
dumper possesses some degree of market power4 on home sales which
enables him to charge a higher price at home than abroad.44 But without
discussing demand factors it cannot be said that the higher home market
price in any proper sense subsidizes sales of lower priced export items.
If demand is more elastic in the export market, an entrepreneur will in
fact maximize his profits in both the long and short run by charging
lower prices for export. Under profit-maximizing price discrimination
he would thus be making the maximum possible contribution to vari-
able and fixed costs from the sales in both markets.
b. Optimal Pricing: Marginal Cost Equated with Marginal Reve-
nue. In pricing theory rational profit-maximizing behavior consists of
producing and selling additional units as long as the addition to revenue
(marginal revenue) attributable to the last unit sold exceeds the mar-
ginal cost of producing that unit.45 Where marginal revenue just equals
marginal cost, profits will be maximized.46
41 See Anthony, supra note 9, at 174-75.
42 See C. KINDLEBERGER, supra note 19, at 151-52.
48 "Market power" is used here to mean an individual firm's ability to affect price
by altering output. As market power increases it phases at some point into monopoly
power. See P. AR.mA, ANrrausT ANALYsIs 127 (1967).
44 See J. ROBINSON, supra note 19, at 179-202; ScHERER 253-57; D. WArsoN, PaiCZ
THEORY AND ITs Usas 311-24 (1963).
45 For a basic discussion of marginal cost, marginal revenue, and profit maximiza-
tion, see SAMUELSON 459-77. For application of optimal pricing analysis to price discrimi-
nation, see de Jong, supra note 19, at 167-68; note 44 supra.
The concept of profit maximization should not be confused with balance sheet profits.
The point of profit maximization is the optimum output point, given the decision to
produce. Fixed costs, which do not vary with output, are ignored. The balance sheet
will show a profit only if maximized revenues are sufficient to cover all costs, fixed and
variable.
46 Economists define marginal cost as the incremental cost of producing the last
unit of output. It normally falls or remains constant at early production stages and be-
gins to rise near capacity output. Marginal revenue is the net addition to revenue attribut-
able to the last unit sold. Under imperfect competition a producer faces a downward
sloping demand curve. Thus the sale of each additional unit of output both adds to and
subtracts from total revenue. The sale itself brings new revenue, but since the greater quan-
tity can only be sold at a lower price, the producer loses revenue on all previous units of
output which must now also be sold at the new lower price. Marginal revenue therefore
equals the price (revenue) of the last unit sold minus the revenue lost by selling prior
units at the new price level. The marginal revenue curve lies below the demand curve
and continues to fall with downward sloping demand. Thus a rational profit maximizer
continues to produce and sell until the falling marginal revenue curve intersects the
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A foreign trader seeking to maximize profits through optimum
production and sales usually faces a single marginal cost curve, but two
separate marginal revenue curves, one each for the home and foreign mar-
kets. His costs remain the same no matter where the output is sold be-
cause his production facilities are concentrated in the home market.47
But consumers in two separate national markets are likely to respond dif-
ferently to changes in price. This produces two separate marginal reve-
nue curves. Under uniform pricing it would be impossible for marginal
cost to equal marginal revenue in both markets. The dumper must
charge a lower price in the more elastic market and a higher price in the
less elastic market for marginal cost to equal marginal revenue in both
markets, which is the condition for optimum output and sales (profit
maximization).48
Since it often happens that elasticity of demand for any given
product is higher in the export than in the home market,49 lower foreign
prices can hardly be thought of as unusual or "artificial." Greater
export market elasticity may result from high tariffs at home which
reduce competition and hence lessen domestic elasticity. It may also
result from reduced buyer attachment to foreign products in the export
market because of the greater risks and longer lead times associated with
a foreign source of supply, or because of greater competition in that
market from local products.
c. Limiting Condition: Price Below Marginal Cost. In theory
only where a low dumping price falls below marginal cost can one say
constant or rising marginal cost curve. One less unit of production would forego the profit
that could be made from producing the next unit at a cost less than the addition to
revenue resulting from its sale. One unit produced and sold beyond the optimum point
would result in a loss because marginal cost would then exceed marginal revenue.
47 If the cost of transportation to the export market were included as a cost of
production, it would be necessary to qualify this statement. But for the purposes of anti-
dumping laws price comparisons between domestic and export sales are usually made at
an ex-factory point. See Hendrick, The United States Antidumping Act, 58 AM. J. INTr'L
L. 914, 919 (1964).
48 These marginalist theories have in fact been borne out by empirical research.
In a survey of 110 domestic manufacturing companies rated as "excellently managed"
by the American Institute of Management it was discovered that most multiproduct
firms did not base pricing on full cost-plus formulas. Prices were found to reflect factors
central to marginalist thinking- expected competitive pressure from other companies and
elasticity of demand among buyers. Earley, Marginal Policies of "Excellently Managed"
Companies, 46 Am. EcoN. REv. 44, 45, 56 (1956). Multiproduct pricing-for example,
different prices for crude oil and residual fuel oil, both resulting from a single manu-
facturing process-is closely analogous to single-product pricing in different markets. In
both cases the price charged must reflect differing conditions of demand. See C. KINDLE-
BERGE, supra note 19, at 151-52.
49 Cf. C. KINDLEBERGER, supra note 19, at 153; J. RoBINSON, supra note 19, at 205-06.
HeinOnline -- 57 Cornell L. Rev. 505 1971-1972
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
with some plausibility that home market sales are subsidizing money-
losing foreign sales. 0 Here marginal revenue, which is always equal to
or less than price, must also lie below marginal cost. Hence greater
revenue could be obtained by raising the export price and, with it,
marginal revenue.
The startling upshot of this analysis is that even sales in the export
market below average total cost need not be money-losing or non-profit-
maximizing. Average revenue is the governing concept. It must equal
or exceed average total cost for a business to be profitable in the balance
sheet sense. Under price discrimination a different price is charged in two
or more markets; hence, average revenue falls somewhere between the
different prices charged. If average revenue happens to equal average
total cost at the optimum output, the business will be profitable and its
activity cost justified in the long run, although at the same time the
lower dumping price in the export market will fall below average total
cost. As long as marginal cost equals marginal revenue in this market
profits will be maximized, and one cannot say that such low pricing in
the export market is artificial or uneconomic. In fact, to charge a higher
price in this market would itself be uneconomic, because it would
reduce profits.51
3. Dumping as Exploitation of Monopoly Power
A third argument against dumping is that, even if seen as profit-
maximizing behavior, dumping exploits the evils of monopoly power.52
Welfare economics teaches that monopoly power is socially undesirable
because, among other reasons, it allows the monopolist to restrict his
output in order to charge prices well above marginal cost and therefore
to reap higher returns. 53 It is thus distortive of proper resource alloca-
tion because more of society's resources should be devoted to the pro-
duction of the goods in question. The quantity should be increased and
the price lowered. Can we say that because profit-maximizing dumping
is based upon the existence of some degree of monopoly power at home,
that such dumping is per se an evil practice or that it further distorts
allocative efficiency in the global economy?
50 Technically, price below marginal cost merely means that greater return could be
earned by raising the price; it does not necessarily mean that books will not balance. see
Ehrenhaft, supra note 9, at 48 n.21; note 45 supra; ef. J. RoBINSoN, supra note 19, at 188-
202; SAMUEISON 471-74; ScHmER 254-55.
51 It is entirely possible that a producer might be able to cover both variable and
fixed costs-and thus remain in business in the long run--only by charging in an export
market a low profit-maximizing dumping price which happened to fall below unit costs.
See J. ROBINsoN, supra note 19, at 203-04; A. Picou, supra note 19, at 286-88.
52 See R. BA r.wiN, supra note 15, at 142-43.
53 See ScHERER 11-17.
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In this form the question is misleading; we must assume that some
degree of monopolization or imperfect competition will remain in the
dumper's home market regardless of what is done about dumping in
foreign markets. There are natural and unavoidable competitive im-
perfections in every market. Antidumping measures can have no effect
on antitrust policy at the dumping source. Hence the correct question is
whether dumping adds to or decreases the allocative distortions as-
sociated with imperfect competition. Are we better off under uniform
monopoly pricing or under price discrimination?54
From the perspective of global efficiency theoretical economists
have found this a difficult and ambiguous question whose answer de-
pends upon variables that are impossible to measure empirically. In
simplified form, the issue is whether total output would increase or
decrease under price discrimination, since allocative inefficiencies as-
sociated with imperfect competition are the result of the monopolist's
excessive restriction of output to earn higher profits. Joan Robinson in
her classic study of imperfect competition demonstrated that the ques-
tion of output expansion or contraction under price discrimination
turns on the elasticities and shapes of demand curves in the home and
foreign markets.5 5 Robinson argued a priori that output under dis-
criminating monopoly was likely to expand, especially where low
priced export sales are involved.5 However, there has been no real
empirical verification of these theoretical probabilities.5 7
Even if nothing conclusive can be said on the question of global
efficiency, the issue is not so clouded from the viewpoint of the country
into which the dumped goods are shipped. In this market more goods
will be supplied at a lower price if dumping is allowed. The lower
price will also more closely approximate the dumper's marginal cost,
the ideal welfare point at which consumer satisfaction from the last unit
sold just matches the cost of producing that unit.5s If consumers in the
dumper's higher priced home market are in fact exploited, the fault lies
with the existence of monopoly power in that market and not with
dumping. Antidumping laws in other countries would not be responsive
to the problem.
54 For discussion of this question in the domestic context, see id. at 257-59.
55 J. ROBINSON, supra note 19, at 188-95.
56 Id. at 205-06.
57 Moreover, Pigou has suggested there may be other more complicated maldistribu-
tive effects which cannot be analyzed in the simple terms of output expansion and contrac-
tion. A. FIGou, supra note 19, at 284-85, 288-89; see J. ROBINsoN, supra note 19, at 206.
58 At prices higher than marginal cost welfare economists have pointed out that
consumers who would have purchased at lower prices are sacrificed to the monopolist's
desire for greater profits. See Scumnm 14-17.
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4. Dumping as Inflicting Injurious Adjustment Costs-The Im-
permanence Argument
A fourth argument against nonpredatory dumping was espoused by
Jacob Viner, perhaps the best known American economist to study
dumping in scholarly fashion. Viner put heavy stress on the length of
time one could expect dumping prices to endure. He classified dumping
into three categories: (1) sporadic dumping-one or two shipments
within a very short time span; (2) intermittent or short run dumping-
lasting months or perhaps a year or longer; and (3) continuous or long
run dumping-extending indefinitely into the future.59
Viner saw nothing objectionable about long run dumping,6 0 which
could result from a permanently more elastic demand in the foreign
market. As long as low prices could be expected to continue, consumers
and intermediate producers could rely upon a permanent source of
cheap goods. The domestic industry could not object to adjusting to
this form of competition.
Sporadic dumping would not promise a permanent source of cheap
goods, but Viner thought this practice simply too brief or haphazard to
be seriously injurious. 61 It might be traceable to the shipment on
consignment of unsold goods which, because of market fluctuations en
route, failed to bring the desired price at destination, or merely to a
casual overstock which for various reasons had to be cleared at lower
prices in the more elastic foreign market. Dumping motivated merely by
excess stock is analogous to "dear the stock" sales of distressed goods by
domestic retailers or bargain basements. Such sales provide a needed
flexibility to the market system, whether on the international or
domestic level, and allow smoother adjustments for miscalculations. 12
Viner considered only short run dumping objectionable. In this
form dumping lasts long enough to be injurious to domestic competitors
but not long enough to be a reliable source of goods for consumers and
intermediate producers. Predatory dumping fits easily into this category,
but Viner's reasoning also embraced simple injurious dumping. His
conclusion seemed to rest on a rough and ready calculus which balanced
59 VINER 23.
60 There is no economic-as distinguished from military, or sentimental, or politi-
cal, or sociological-argument which has yet been presented by upholders of
tariff protection which makes an adequate reply to the free-trade case against
the restriction of permanently cheap imports.
Id. at 145 (emphasis in original).
61 Id. at 30.
62 See C. KINDLEBERGER, supra note 19, at 157-58.
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benefits to consumers against injury to producers. Short-lived consumer
benefits in the form of lower prices could not offset serious injury to
domestic producers in the form of reduced output and sales.63
Viner's approach raises at least two troublesome issues: (1) if only
intermittent or short run dumping is to be condemned, how can we
know from the existence of price discrimination alone whether we are
dealing with the sporadic, short run or long run variety? and (2) even if
we are able to identify short run dumping practices, by what criterion
can we say that the short run domestic producer injury outweighs the
short run domestic consumer benefit?
a. Price Discrimination as Weak Evidence of Impermanence.
Viner's confidence in the usual impermanence of dumping sales was
apparently based more on observation than theory.64 We may assert with
confidence that money-losing sales will be temporary, but how are we to
know from price discrimination alone if dumping is profit-maximizing
in the long or short run? Only if prices are below marginal cost can we
say conclusively that money-losing sales are involved. A test involving
marginal cost estimates would, of course, be administratively unwork-
able. An average cost standard, which as we have seen is not in every case
determinative of non-profit-maximizing behavior, might be thought to
give a rough approximation of such cases. But from an administrative
point of view average cost calculations would not gain much over
marginal cost calculations. Moreover, for consistency, it would probably
be necessary to oppose uniform pricing below average cost as well, since
such sales might also be expected to be temporary.
b. The Costs of Impermanence Versus the Importance of Com-
petitive Rivalry. The more serious flaw in the Viner argument, however,
lies in its failure to stress the importance of vigorous competition in the
marketplace. If dumping impermanence results from a firm's studied
responses to cyclical demand conditions or from market testing and
experimentation, is there cause to attack the transient nature of these
practices or rather to exult at the evidence they bear of a healthy com-
petitive process? From the competitive point of view, permanence
rather than impermanence in business practices should be viewed with
suspicion. In the predatory situation it is not the impermanence of the
dumping price which is distressing, but the high monopoly price which
is expected to follow.
The only plausible ground on which business injury from dumped
68 See VINER 145-47; Anthony, supra note 9, at 165-68; Viner, Memorandum on Dump-
ing, in VINER 356-57.
64 See Viner, Memorandum on Dumping, in VINER 358-59.
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imports may be seen to offset short run consumer benefits from low
prices requires us to assume in advance that domestic producers are
vigorously competitive and roughly as efficient as the foreign competi-
tion.65 It could then be argued that elimination of adjustment costs
caused by short run dumping would allow domestic firms to offer lower
prices to the consumer in the long run. This of course begs the question.
Even assuming that short run dumping practices may not reflect the long
run efficiency advantages of the foreign producer, legislation designed to
discourage dumping in all of its short run forms would defeat healthy
influences on price competition in the domestic market. And if our
assumption of vigorous competition among domestic producers is not
realistic, there would be no incentive to offer lower prices to the con-
sumer, no matter how much the producer's costs of adjustment are
reduced by protecting against short run foreign competition.16
c. The Procompetitive Effects of Competitive and Cyclical Pricing.
Dumping of longer than sporadic duration but not lasting indefinitely
can be attributed to several motives: 67 (1) a producer might charge low
prices to facilitate entering a market as a new firm, to create demand for
a new product, to retain customers in an established market in the face
of lower prices from competitors, or to test market alternatives as an
experimental ploy; (2) he might dump in the short run in order to
continue to operate at full capacity in the face of a cyclical downturn in
demand at home; or (3) he might be a predator. Only the predatory
motive would have negative effects on the competitive process itself. The
first two, introductory or experimental pricing and cyclical demand
pricing, might be thought of as procompetitive and anticompetitive
respectively.68
Economists evaluate competitive vigor in the marketplace in terms
of three important criteria: market structure, competitor conduct, and
overall economic performance.69 The last criterion merely measures the
overall efficiency of the production and distribution system and the
level of innovative vigor. The question of market structure concerns
65 For a discussion of dumping which explicitly makes this assumption, see Anthony,
supra note 9, at 165.
66 Cf. SCHmERn 200-06. Scherer discusses the analogous problem of cutthroat com-
petition in the wholly domestic setting. See text accompanying notes 71-75 infra.
67 See VINER 23-31; cf. ScHmm 256-57, 261-62; Bowman, supra note 32, at 77.
68 For discussion of the procompetitive aspects of price discrimination, see ScnUmR
261; Bowman, supra note 32, at 77-78.
69 See generally ScHERER 3-6; see also J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZAnON (2d ed.
1968); R. CAvEs, AmmucAN INDusTRY: STRUcrURE, CoNDucnr, PERFORmANcE (2d ed. 1967);
Mueller, The New Antitrust: A "Structural" Approach, I ANTITRusT L. & ECON. REv. 87
(Winter 1967).
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the number of business firms, their relative market shares, and the
existence and severity of barriers to entry. A highly competitive market
structure would require a large number of firms, each having a small
percentage of the total market, and the absence of entry barriers. The
conduct criterion concerns the manner in which firms make output and
pricing decisions-whether independently, interdependently, or col-
lusively-and the purpose or effect of those decisions, that is, whether
they reflect interfirm rivalry, exclusion of newcomers, or predation.
Competitive conduct would call for independent pricing and output
decisions seeking to maximize profits in the face of sharp rivalry.
In these terms it can be seen that low introductory, meeting com-
petition, and experimental prices have highly procompetitive effects on
market structure and conduct. Low promotional or meeting competition
prices either add another firm to the market or preserve a market posi-
tion and thus ensure future rivalry. It is in fact the very short-lived
nature of these pricing practices which contributes to their procompeti-
tive effect. If a dumper continued to charge money-losing low prices
long enough to acquire an alarmingly large share of the market, one
might begin to fear predatory motives or effects. In terms of market
conduct, reducing prices to meet or undercut the competition is the
essence of rivalry, and experimental pricing displays the kind of in-
dependence in pricing decisions which marks proper competitive con-
duct.
With regard to cyclical demand dumping, the positive effects on the
competitive process center more on conduct than market structure.
Price shading through dumping in a foreign market in response to
decreasing demand at home can have very healthy effects on competitive
conduct by undermining any tendency toward oligopolistic price disci-
pline in the import market.70 This kind of price competition is especially
salutary as an antidote to inflationary pressures currently prevalent in
the American market which keep prices high despite recessionary
conditions.
Price competition in the face of downturns in demand may be
costly, especially if the market into which dumped goods are shipped
also feels the effect of decreasing demand. This is analogous to the
problem of cutthroat competition among a group of undisciplined
oligopolists with high fixed overhead and low day-to-day operating
costs.7 1 In the face of a recessionary decline in demand, the temptation
for each is to cut prices to maintain the efficiency of capacity output and
70 See ScHaEER 261.
71 For general discussion of the problem of cutthroat competition, see id. at 198-206.
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to make as large a contribution as possible to the cost of fixed overhead.
Downward spiralling price competition may continue over a wide range
down to the ultimate constraint of low marginal cost. Profits would be
higher for all firms in an industry if they collusively agreed upon a
higher price and reduced output for each.
Producers in such industries argue that abnormal competition in
the trough of decreasing demand is foolishly wasteful. Depressed
business conditions are expected to be only temporary and full produc-
tion facilities will be needed in the long run to meet higher, more
normal demand requirements. "Stop and go" operation of plants is
said to lead to serious inefficiencies which could be eliminated by "fair
trade" price maintenance laws. Such laws would prohibit a firm from
undercutting standard or agreed upon prices during periods of de-
creasing demand.
But in the absence of competitive stimulus there is no reason to
expect protected oligopolists to pass on cost savings to the consumer.
F.M. Scherer has demonstrated that if oligopolists are allowed to
stabilize prices to avoid cutthroat competition, prices are likely to
remain fixed during periods of economic recession and to rise to higher
levels during boom periods.72 Only government price regulation of the
public utility variety could safeguard against this possibility if a pro-
competitive policy is abandoned.73
From the empirical evidence available, refusal to amend domestic
antitrust policy to accommodate the cutthroat competition argument
appears to have been wise. Studies of industries allegedly susceptible to
the excesses of cutthroat competition, such as steel, sugar, tobacco, and
bicycle and cement manufacturing, have shown that all have weathered
periods of stiff competition without serious injury.74 Except during the
great depression of the early 1930's, conduct resembling ruinous com-
petition appears to have been extremely rare.75
Where objectionable competition originates abroad, as in the
dumping case, there is of course always a greater willingness to indulge
producer-biased thinking" and to sacrifice the consumer-oriented pro-
competitive policies which lie behind liberal trade theory. Many of the
same industries which have complained of cutthroat competition in the
domestic market-steel, bicycles, and cement-have in fact won pro-
72 Id. at 202-06.
73 See Anthony, supra note 9, at 176-77.
74 See discussion and authorities cited in ScHERE 205.
75 Id. at 206.
76 See C. KINDLEBERGER, supra note 19, at 158.
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tection against foreign dumping in the past.7 7 It seems clear that these
industries, all oligopolistic in structure, are especially sensitive to price
competition. To give them protection against low dumping prices on
the ground of impermanence alone would sacrifice many of the virtues
of the competitive market system. This must be viewed as a contradic-
tion of, rather than a legitimate exception to, free trade theory.
5. Summary
My discussion of the economics of dumping and free trade theory
suggests that the "unfair competition" argument has validity only
where anticompetitive or predatory dumping is involved. Opposition to
dumping on the ground that it involves artificial non-cost-justified be-
havior is misleading, unless we know that dumping prices are below
marginal cost. Otherwise we might be dealing with an entirely "cost-
justified" case of profit-maximizing behavior, where marginal cost
equals marginal revenue in all markets irrespective of the ratable
distribution of long run fixed costs. Arguments that global efficiency
will suffer if dumping is permitted fail to approach the question from
the correct perspective. If we assume as a practical matter that market
imperfections are unavoidable, the question then becomes which of the
two available choices, discriminatory or uniform monopoly pricing, will
lead to greater allocative efficiency. Because of the complicated, un-
certain variables involved, no completely satisfactory answer can be
given to this question. I can say with some confidence, however, that
only consumers in the high priced market will suffer from the distor-
tions associated with high monopoly prices. I also noted the difficulty
of predicting impermanence from evidence of price discrimination
alone. More important, opposition to dumping on the ground of its
impermanence would seem to give excessive weight to producer interests
and to ignore the importance of competitive pricing to the efficient
functioning of the market system. A number of forms of short run
dumping may cause business injury to domestic rivals, but this is the
essence of free trade and the competitive system.
D. The Influence of Arguments Against Dumping on the Tests of
Dumping Injury
The arguments I have discussed bear directly on the issue of what
measures should be taken against foreign dumpers. The nub of the
7 See, e.g., Steel Reinforcing Bars from Canada, 29 Fed. Reg. 2840 (Tariff Comm'n
1964); Portland Cement from the Dominican Republic, 28 Fed. Reg. 4047 (Tariff Comm'n
1963); Bicycles from Czechoslovakia, 25 Fed. Reg. 9782 (Tariff Comm'n 1960).
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issue lies in the definition of injury to the competing industry in the
country receiving the dumped goods. The valid predation argument
against dumping would seem to call for an injury test designed to pro-
tect only the competitive process itself. The unsound arguments against
dumping suggest tests which would protect individual competitors.
The distinction is essentially one between quantitative and qualita-
tive tests of injury. The unsound arguments would trigger antidumping
measures in response to varying degrees of ordinary business injury to
domestic competitors. The criteria here would include loss of sales, price
deterioration, loss of profits, unemployment, and idling of plant capac-
ity. Injury of this kind in sufficiently great quantity and duration could
eliminate even efficient competitors and thus have a negative impact
on competitive rivalry. But where quantitative injury does not reach
such a destructive threshold, how is one to know whether the injury
inflicted is merely the sign of a healthy competitive process or of bud-
ding predation? Qualitatively different tests are needed to measure
competition-lessening effects in the marketplace.
1. The Valid Test-Injury to Competition
Commentators in the Robinson-Patman field have offered a num-
ber of useful tests by which to evaluate economic action and to preserve
an "injury to competition" standard.78 These tests, which may be ap-
plied with only slight adaptation to the dumping context, stress
predatory intent, market structure, competitive conduct, and cost
information.79 Unless the quantitative criteria signal injury of major
proportions, such qualitative tests should be of critical importance if
only predatory dumping is to be condemned.
First, emphasis should be placed on the actual or implied predatory
intent of the dumper. Since revealing business letters and confession-
prone directors are likely to be rarae ayes, inference should probably
play a large role. Here one would look to such factors as the degree by
which the delivered price of dumped goods undercuts the domestic
78 See Comment, Unlawful Primary Line Price Discriminations: Predatory Intent
and Competitive Injury, 68 CoLuM. L. Ray. 137 (1968); Comment, Territorial Price Dis-
crimination: The Competitive Injury Requirement Reconsidered, 36 Gao. WAsH. L. REv.
164 (1967); Comment, supra note 89, at 241-42; Comment, Competitive Injury Under the
Robinson-Patman Act, 74 HIAv. L. Rav. 1597 (1961); see also Bowman, supra note 32;
Brooks, Injury to Competition Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 109 U. PA. L. Rav. 777
(1961); Dam, The Economics and Law of Price Discrimination: Herein of Three Regu-
latory Schemes, 81 U. Cm. L. REv. 1 (1963); Elman, The Robinson-Patman Act and Anti-
trust Policy: A Time for Reappraisal, 42 U. WAsn. L. R-v. 1 (1966).
79 See Comment, supra note 78, 68 CoLmm. L. Rav. at 141-49; Comment, supra note
89, at 241; Comment, supra note 78, 74 HARV. L. Rav. at 1602-10.
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price, the substantiality of market invasion, and the rapidity with which
the invasion proceeds.
Second, structural factors in the domestic industry, such as entry
barriers and the relative size and power of the respective competitors,
should be considered. Thus injury should rarely be found if entry
barriers--for example, tariffs or start-up capital requirements-are high
or if the competitive struggle pits a small foreign dumper against a few
large and powerful domestic rivals.
Third, the test should include consideration of conduct factors
such as domestic pricing patterns before and after dumping sales take
place. A history of price rigidity or oligopolistic price discipline in the
market receiving the dumped goods should weigh against a finding of
dumping injury.
Fourth, some attention should be paid to cost data supplied by the
foreign dumper to determine whether pricing decisions are profit-
maximizing. Here it must be remembered that only sales below mar-
ginal cost are conclusively non-profit-maximizing, and even those may
be justified for promotional or experimental purposes.
2. The Invalid Test-Injury to Competitors
Arguments against nonpredatory dumping of course favor an
"injury to competitors" approach. Indeed, under the unfair competition
or artificial advantage arguments, any legally cognizable business injury
would merit antidumping action. Loss of sales by a single domestic
competitor as a result of price competition from dumped imports might
meet such a de minimis standard even if the complaining firm were
inefficient and marginal. Since under these arguments economic evil is
seen to lie in the practice of price discrimination itself, an injury test
avoids only frivolous or inconsequential claims.80
Viner's argument against dumping, although not restricted to the
predatory situation, was at least predicated upon the existence of sub-
stantial injury to domestic producers.8' The substantiality requirement
presumably served to counterbalance the loss of consumer benefits
and the possibility in any given dumping case that unobjectionable
long run dumping might be involved.
The Viner approach is reminiscent of the injury test under various
versions of the escape clause included in the 1947 GATT agreement82
80 Most of the recent Tariff Commission determinations of injury seem to have been
based on a de minimis theory of injury. See note 283 and accompanying text infra.
81 VINER 145-47; Viner, Memorandum on Dumping, in id. at 847-73.
82 Article XIX of the GATT provides in part:
If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations
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and in the legislation authorizing United States participation in tariff
negotiations under GATT auspices.8 3 The general thrust of these
provisions is to allow withdrawal of negotiated tariff concessions where a
trade agreement results in such an influx of imports as to cause serious
injury to a domestic industry producing the same or a competitive
product.8 4 There is no requirement that the imports be discriminatorily
priced. The purpose is plainly protectionist and can arguably be justi-
fied as a short run exception to free trade principles that allows a given
sector of a national economy to adjust to the vigor of foreign compe-
tition.
In sum, an ordinary business injury test, even one based on substan-
tial injury, contains strong elements of protectionist bias. One might
suggest that the bias is a political necessity. Indeed, it might be urged
that the escape clause principle should be expanded to apply to any
sudden influx of low priced imports-not merely those resulting from
tariff concessions-especially if relief from foreign competition were
allowed for only a limited period.85 But unless the degree of business
incurred by a contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff conces-
sions, any product is being imported into the territory of that contracting party
in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten
serious injury to domestic producers in that territory of like or directly competi-
tive products, the contracting party shall be free . . . to suspend the obligation
GATT art. XIX (1)(a), 61 Stat. A58 (1947) (emphasis added). In general, however, a party
suspending an obligation under this section must be willing to negotiate other offsetting
concessions or suffer retaliation from the parties affected. Id. art. XIX (2),(3), 61 Stat.
A59 (1947).
83 Under the version of the escape clause appearing in the Trade Expansion Act of
1962 (Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 [hereinafter cited as TEA]), which superseded
prior trade agreement legislation, a negotiated tariff concession may be removed if the
Tariff Commission determines that
as a result in major part of concessions granted under trade agreements, an arti-
cle is being imported into the United States in such increased quantities as to
cause, or threaten to cause, serious injury to the domestic industry producing an
article which is like or directly competitive with the imported article.
19 U.S.C. § 1901(b)(1) (1970) (emphasis added).
84 Injury for escape clause purposes has traditionally been measured by a range of
factors indicating ordinary business injury-for example, decreases in domestic production,
sales, wages, employment, profits, and inventories. See Trade Agreements Extension Act
of 1951, ch. 141, § 7(b), 65 Stat. 74, repealed, TEA § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 1901(b)(2) (1970).
The present provisions of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 are similar but not so de-
tailed.
85 The changes in the escape clause provisions drafted into the proposed Trade Act
of 1971, S. 4, H.R. 20, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971), would have produced substantially this
result. See Note, supra note 14, at 1433-36. Thus far these changes have not been enacted.
See also Hudec, supra note 8, at 1354-55.
For general discussion of the escape clause, see Banner, "In Major Part"--The New
Causation Problem in the Trade-Agreements Program, 44 TxxAs L. Rav. 1331 (1966);
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injury involved is so widespread and substantial as to threaten a de
facto lessening of competition, there appears to be no reason to single
out for the application of such a clearly protectionist standard only
those imports which happen to be discriminatorily low priced. Unless
we are dealing with predatory dumping there is no good reason to
treat dumped imports less liberally than other imports.
II
EVOLUTION IN TRAF, DISTORTION: FROM DUMPING
TO ANTIDUMPING LAWS
The early concern of the international trading community was
with dumping as a distortion of natural trade patterns. Public officials
and businessmen often cited the danger of predation as their reason for
opposing the practice, but the economic dynamics of price discrimina-
tion which we have explored were not well understood. Antidumping
fervor was often indistinguishable from general opposition to import
competition. To protect against the alleged and ill defined evils of
dumping, the major trading nations enacted broadly worded anti-
dumping legislation with serious potential for protectionist abuse. Only
recently has the trading community come to realize the greater threat to
world trade inherent in these laws.
A. Early Claims Against Dumping
Viner traced dumping to sixteenth century Elizabethan England
where foreigners were charged with selling paper at a loss to prevent
the rise of the new British paper industry.88 During the mercantile pe-
riod in general, however, nations were primarily concerned with
"bounty dumping," the governmental practice of granting export and
production subsidies on internationally traded goods.87
Genuine concern with price discrimination by private firms arose
only after the Industrial Revolution made large scale production pos-
sible.88 Industrialization spurred the growth of giant industries-for
Bronz, The Tariff Commission as a Regulatory Agency, 61 COLum. L. REv. 463, 468-71
(1961); Metzger, The Escape Clause and Adjustment Assistance: Proposals and Assessments,
2 LIAw & PoLicY INTL' Bus. 352 (1970); Surrey, Legal Problems To Be Encountered in the
Operation of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 41 N.C.L. Rlv. 389, 394-97; Note, Adjust.
ment Assistance: A New Proposal for Eligibility, 55 CO=NLL L. REv. 1049 (1970); Note,
supra note 14, at 1433-36.
so Viner-, Dumping, in VINER 374-75.
87 See HABERL, THEoRY 317; ViNER 36; Ehrenhaft, supra note 9, at 50-52.
88 See VINEm 36, 51. Viner chronicles dumping practices in and by the major trading
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example, in chemicals and steel-which eventually developed into car-
tels in Europe and trusts in America. Industrialization also fostered
greater protectionism. Hence, by the turn of the century the prerequi-
sites for widespread dumping existed:8 9 customs laws and transportation
costs delineated separate national markets and concentrated economic
power allowed cartels and trusts to control output and adjust prices to
the conditions prevailing in these markets.
From 1890 to 1914 it was apparently a common practice for Ger-
man cartels, protected at home behind high tariff walls, to charge lower
prices for export than for home consumption. 0 At the same time fre-
quent complaints were made against American dumping of steel prod-
ucts and heavy machinery in Europe and Canada, as well as in the British
colonies.91 But such practices seem to have been actuated primarily by
the desire to maintain the efficiency of full production and the profit-
ability of high, stable prices at home.9 2 Prices in the world markets
simply reflected world competition.
Allegations of predatory motive were not infrequent. For example,
in 1919 the American alien property custodian, A. Mitchell Palmer,
charged that German dumping of chemicals and military dyestuffs was
intended to crush American competition and establish a worldwide
monopoly.93 Viner, however, pointed out the general lack of evidence
to support such charges and the likelihood that war-fostered anti-
German propaganda lay behind most of them.94 Opposition to import
competition of all kinds also played a role in such complaints.
B. The Rise of National Antidumping Laws
The international trading community first sought to control dump-
ing through international agreements condemning the practice and by
placing the duty of prevention on the dumper's home government. 95
Although the initial agreements in the late nineteenth century were
often more concerned with government subsidies (bounty dumping),96
nations from the post-industrial period forward. Id. at 51-93. See also Ehrenhaft, supra
note 9, at 51.
89 See HABESLER, TEoRY 301-02.
90 See VxNEa 51-66.
91 See id. at 88-90.
92 See id. at 59-61.
93 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, ANTIDUMPING LEGISLATION, H.R. REP. No. 479,
66th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1919).
94 See VINE 61-65.
95 See S. Doc. No. 112, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1934); Ehrenhaft, supra note 9, at
51-52.
96 See S. Doc. No. 112, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1934).
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resolutions of the League of Nations and the 1927 Geneva World Eco-
nomic Conference clearly condemned predatory dumping and dumping
which disrupted world markets. 97 These efforts largely failed, probably
because home governments had no interest in curtailing their exports.
The serious phase of national action against dumping began in
1904 when Canada became the first nation to assess special duties against
dumped imports. 98 Similar legislation was passed in New Zealand in
190511 and in the Union of South Africa in 1914.100 But it was not until
the post-World War I period that antidumping laws spread to the
United States and Europe, spurred by protectionist sentiment and fears
of ruinous German dumping.101 In 1916 the United States had ap-
pended to the Revenue Act of that year two sections0 2 which in effect
extended the anti-price discrimination provisions of the 1914 Clayton
Act to foreign commerce. But the 1916 provisions were unique; they
called for criminal sanctions and treble damage relief. But they have
never been applied. In 1921 antidumping statutes levying special dudes
on dumped imports were passed in the United States, Australia, and
Great Britain.10 3 By 1958 virtually all the major trading nations had
antidumping provisions in one form or another, although they were
most commonly enforced in the Anglo-American world. 0
C. The Protectionist Character of Antidumping Legislation
From the outset antidumping laws had overtones of protectionism.
They were generally enacted as part of tariff legislation, they utilized
a tariff-like remedy, and they were usually administered by customs
officials. 105 In operation they involved protectionism of two different
97 1 WORLD ECONOMC CONFERENCE, REPORT AND PROCEEDINGS, LEAGUE OF NATIONS,
EcON. & FIN. H, No. 52, at 44 (1927); ECONOMIC CONSULTATIVE Core., REPORT: ECONOMIC
ORGANISATION, LEAGUE OF NATIONS, ECON. & FIN. II, No. 18, at 13 (1928). These resolutions
are reprinted in S. Doc. No. 112, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 (1934).
98 An Act To Amend the Customs Tariff, 1897, 4 Edw. 7, c. 11, § 19 (Can. 1904); see
ViNE 192-204.
99 The Agricultural Implement Manufacture, Importation, and Sale Act, 1905, 5
Edw. 7, No. 58 (N.Z. 1905); see ViNE 204-06.
100 Act of July 7, 1914, Concerning the Imposition of Customs Duties, [1914] S.
Africa Statutes, No. 26, § 8; see ViNER 209-12.
101 See VnqE 216-17, 258-65; Ehrenhaft, supra note 9, at 51.
102 Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, §§ 800-01, 39 Stat. 798, 15 U.S.C. §§ 71-72 (1970).
103 Antidumping Act of 1921, ch. 14, tit. Ir, 42 Stat. 11; Customs Tariff (Industries
Preservation) Act, 1921, [1921) Commw. Acts, No. 28 (AustI.); Safeguarding of Industries
Act, 1921, 11 & 12 Geo. 5, c. 47; see VINER 216-31, 258-65.
104 See GATT, ANTn-DUmuvING AND COUNTERVAILING DUrS 5-6 (1958); see generally
GATT, ANTI-DU PING AND COUNTE uNG DUTIES: REPORT OF ExPERTs (1961) [herein-
after cited as REPORT or ExPERTs].
105 See GATT, ANTI-DU PING AND COUNTERVAILMG DUTIES 12 (1958).
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kinds, substantive and procedural. The broad operative concepts of
this legislation could be expansively interpreted to subject a significant
portion of a country's imported goods to special antidumping duties.
And even if no duty were ultimately imposed, the administrative pro-
cedures involved were often sufficient in themselves to have a chilling
effect on imports.
1. Substantive Protectionism
Antidumping laws generally require two affirmative determina-
tions before special duties may be levied against offending imports. The
goods must be found first to be discriminatorily low priced and second
to cause or threaten to cause injury to the domestic market.
Antidumping statutes have not often condemned price discrimi-
nation directly; rather, they have usually been designed to combat sales
below "normal value"10 6 or below "fair value."' 07 But in practice these
terms have come to mean sales at a price below the price charged in the
home market, the price in some third country market, or, in rare cases,
the estimated cost of production in the home market. 08 At one point
Swedish law compared the price of imported goods with a standard "ref-
erence price" set by the government, which fluctuated with the price
of domestic Swedish goods.109 Thus, in effect, any imports below the
domestic Swedish price would be affected by the antidumping law. But
few countries have followed such a blatantly protectionist approach.
Rather, the major issue has become whether, and to what degree, to
allow on export commerce price adjustments attributable to cost sav-
ings from such factors as bulk shipments, reduced promotional ex-
penses, lower maintenance, and the like. 110 Refusal to allow such
adjustments, even under reasonable circumstances, would stamp many
imports as priced below "fair value." But levy of antidumping duties
would still depend ultimately on the injury finding.
A weak standard of injury would operate to bar all price discrimi-
nation in international trade. Foreign suppliers would be forced to
lower their domestic price whenever they wished to offer a low, com-
106 GATT, art. VI, 61 Stat. A23 (1947), as modified, 62 Stat 3682, T.A.S. No. 1890
(1948).
107 Antidumping Act, § 201(a), 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970).
108 See, e.g., the American definition of "fair value" included in the Treasury De-
partment's Antidumping Regulations. 19 C.F.R. §§ 153.2-153.5 (1971).
109 See GATT Ruling, Swedish Antidumping Duties, in GATT, BAsic INSRUMENTS
AND SELECTrED DOCUMENTS 81 (3d Supp. 1955) (complaint by Italy against Sweden).
110 See REPORT OF ExPERTS 7-10. For discussion of the United States practice as of
1968, see Hendrick, Administration of the U.S. Antidumping Act-Procedures and Policies,
in CowEarDruM 162-66; Hendrick, supra note 47, at 922-23.
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petitive price in an export market. This could have the protectionist
effect of barring trade by making it too costly.
Until recently, antidumping legislation could be found which con-
tained no injury requirement at all or very broad language which could
be interpreted to the same effect. The 1904 Canadian law, by assessing
duties against all dumped goods if they were merely "of a class or kind
made or produced in Canada,"'' in effect had no injury standard. The
1921 United States statute, which is still in effect, is an example of the
use of broad language. Special duties are to be assessed whenever "an
industry in the United States is being or is likely to be injured.., by
reason of the importation of [discriminatorily low priced merchan-
dise]. ' 1" 2 There are three operative concepts in the American language:
existence of an industry, injury to it, and a causal relation between
dumped imports and the injury. The industry concept is often broken
into two further notions, a product market and a geographic market
area. Each of these concepts can be infused with a different meaning
depending on the objective in mind, that is, depending on whether the
objective is to bar price discrimination per se, injurious dumping, or
predatory dumping.113
For example, under an anticompetitive definition concerned mostly
with maintaining domestic competitive rivalry, the product market
would include the market for those goods which are genuinely com-
petitive with or substitutes for the dumped product in question.114 The
geographic market would be drawn to include the actual area or areas
within which firms dealing in the relevant product lines actually com-
pete.115 In cement this might be limited to the Northeast area of the
United States, while in steel products this might extend to the entire
continental United States. Injury would mean injury to competition
rather than injury to particular competitors. The requirement of a
causal relation between dumping and lessened competition might in-
volve identifying the individual foreign suppliers who could conceiv-
ably threaten competition, rather than linking injury to dumped goods
from all sources. 116
111 An Act To Amend the Customs Tariff, 1897, 4 Edw. 7, c. 11, § 19 (Can. 1904). For
discussion of the new Canadian law implementing the International Antidumping Code,
see text accompanying notes 174-83 infra.
112 Antidumping Act § 201(a), 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970).
113 See notes 78-85 and accompanying text supra.
114 This is a simplified statement of only a part of the complex question of market
definition in antitrust law. See generally P. APa-EA, supra note 43, at 127-58.
115 Id.
116 See text accompanying notes 308-10 infra.
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But the statutory language will also support a more protectionist
approach. Under a standard condemning price discrimination per se,
a single firm producing green wrapping paper might constitute an "in-
dustry,"117 a small loss of green paper sales by this firm might constitute
injury,118 and the most remote connection between dumping and such
injury might constitute cause. 1 9 Under an injurious dumping standard,
higher quantitative thresholds would be required for each concept, but
the overall test would approximate a predatory or anticompetitive
standard only if such thresholds were very high.
In sum, antidumping statutes drafted in broad terms are in-
herently subject to protectionist application whenever national officials
choose to find price discrimination freely and to employ de minimis
tests of injury.
2. Procedural Protectionism
On the procedural side, antidumping legislation in most countries
has been subject to abusive administration with regard to several issues,
including: 20 (1) the substantiality required of a complaint before pro-
ceedings are initiated; (2) the overall length of the proceedings; (3) the
availability and application of provisional measures; (4) the retroactivity
of provisional remedies and final duties; and (5) the degree to which
proceedings are fair and open, and give concerned parties proper ad-
vance notice and an opportunity to be heard. With respect to each of
these issues, abusive procedures indirectly penalize goods which come
under dumping suspicion-sometimes by the tactical design of domestic
complainants-and thus impede the free flow of trade even where no
positive dumping finding is ultimately made.
In the past, foreign exporters to the United States have often been
critical of American procedures with respect to the first four of these
issues.' 2 ' Since 1954 American antidumping proceedings have been
administered by two separate agencies. 22 The Treasury Department
117 For discussion of the Tariff Commission's recent tendency towards an excessively
narrow market definition, see text accompanying notes 251-68 infra.
118 For discussion of the Commission's new de minimis test of injury, see text ac-
companying notes 281-93 infra.
119 For discussion of the Commission's new "contributing cause" doctrine, see text
accompanying notes 311-17 infra.
120 See REPORT or Exs'ERis 15-19; U.S. TAmvR' CoMMs'N, OPETMON OF THE TRADE
AGREEmENTS PRoGRAm-19H RErORT 229-31 (1967).
121 See U.S. TARIF Comm'N, supra note 120; Rehm, The Kennedy Round of Trade
Negotiations, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 403, 429-30 (1968).
122 The Customs Simplification Act of 1954, ch. 1213, § 301, 68 Stat. 1138, 19 US.C.
§ 160 (1970), transferred the determination of dumping injury from the Treasury to the
Tariff Commission.
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first determines price discrimination and, if its decision is affirmative,
the Tariff Commission then decides the injury question. This bifurca-
tion in function facilitates the initiation of dumping investigations but
increases the length of the total proceeding. Evidence of price discrimi-
nation alone might suffice to launch a Treasury investigation; at the
same time, reserving the injury question for a later investigation by
the Tariff Commission naturally lengthens the overall proceedings.
American procedures also require withholding of appraisement
with respect to all goods merely suspected of being sold at discrimina-
torily low prices. 128 This means that as a provisional remedy customs
officials suspend determination of the full amount of ad valorem and
other duties payable. In some cases withholding may be applied
retroactively to reach goods imported as much as four months prior to
the initial dumping complaint. 24 Once appraisement is withheld an
importer cannot know what his duty liability might ultimately be. Thus
further importation of the goods involved is often either greatly di-
minished or curtailed altogether, unless the import price is raised. 125
The longer the period of time during which goods are subjected to a
provisional remedy such as withholding, the greater the protectionist
impact. In the United States, some cases have resulted in withholding of
appraisement for as long as nine months to a year or longer.2 6
Recent procedures in European countries have imposed many of
these same or similar burdens and have also lacked many ordinary due
process safeguards.'2 7 Final determinations have been reached without
giving regular notice to the parties involved and without allowing them
to present oral or written evidence.128 Such procedures have a serious
protectionist impact; they encourage foreign suppliers to raise prices
123 19 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970).
124 Id. The new 1968 antidumpting regulations withhold appraisement only from
the date of the decision to withhold, although discretion is retained to apply the remedy
retroactively. 19 C.F.R. § 153.48(a) (1971); see text accompanying notes 23941 infra.
125 Pig Iron from Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Romania, & the U.S.S.R., 3
Fed. Reg. 15,904 (Treas. 1968); Cast Iron Soil Pipe from Poland, 32 Fed. Reg. 12,925 (Tariff
Comm'n 1967) (withholding apparently stopped importation); Coudert, supra note 9, at
197-98; Prosterman, supra note 9, at 318-19; but see Conner & Buschlinger, supra note 9,
at 130; Hendrick, supra note 110, at 160 n.33.
126 See Ehrenhaft, supra note 9, at 61; Hearings on Tariff and Trade Proposals
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 521-22 (1970).
Long withholding periods are common. See, e.g., Window Glass from the U.S.S.R., 28
Fed. Reg. 7610 (Treas. July 1963) (withholding), 29 Fed. Reg. 13,581 (Tariff Comm'n Sept.
1964) (no injury); White Portland Cement from Japan, 28 Fed. Reg. 9996 (Treas. Sept.
1963) (withholding), 29 Fed. Reg. 9636 (Tariff Comm'n July 1964) (no injury).
127 See Rehm, supra note 121, at 429.
128 See US. TAIUF Comm'N, supra note 120, at 230; Kelly, supra note 15, at 300.
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rather than risk entanglement with arbitrarily enforced antidumping
laws.
III
CURBING THE PROTECTIONIST POTENTIAL OF ANTIDUMPING
LAWS THROUGH INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT
In the years immediately following World War II the Western
trading nations joined in a cooperative effort to structure international
agreements and institutions to encourage freer economic intercourse,
and thus to blunt the tendency toward nationalistic, "beggar thy neigh-
bor" economic policies. 29 In this cooperative spirit, the United States
in 1945 suggested that the subject of dumping and antidumping laws be
included in the discussions which eventually led to the adoption of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947.130
A. GATT Article VI
GATT article VI, covering antidumping and countervailing duties,
plagues both the dumping and antidumping houses, but the former
mainly in hortatory terms: "The contracting parties recognize that
dumping... is to be condemned if it causes or threatens material in-
jury to an established industry in the territory of a contracting
party .... 131 The qualifying phrase clearly exempts price discrimina-
tion per se from opprobrium. Moreover, this article imposes no affirma-
tive duty on any nation actually to prevent private firm dumping.
Indeed, article VI obligates the contracting parties not to levy
antidumping duties unless certain standards for determining price dis-
crimination and injury are met. First, import sales must be below the
"margin of dumping," which is expressly defined to mean one of three
values-the home market price, the highest third market price, or the
cost of production in the country of origin.132 The contracting parties
are also required to make "[d]ue allowance.., for differences in condi-
tions and terms of sale .... ,u3" Second, there must be injury to or
retardation of a domestic industry and the injury must be "material."' 3 4
129 Chayes, Legal Institutions of the International Economy, 1967 UTAH L. REv. 331.
130 See J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 403-04.
131 GATT art. VI(l), as modified, 62 Stat. 3682, T.I.A.S. No. 1890 (1948).
132 Id. The third market price or cost of production (defined so as to include a
"reasonable addition for profit') may be used only if no domestic price exists.
133 Id.
134 Id. art. VI(6)(a), as modified, 62 Stat. 8683, T.I.A.S. No. 1890 (1948).
[Vol. 57:491
HeinOnline -- 57 Cornell L. Rev. 524 1971-1972
ANTIDUMPING LAWS
Although these terms are not defined further, they clearly exclude anti-
dumping laws which combat price discrimination per se.
The major drawback to article VI, however, lies in its nonbinding
character. Most of the national antidumping laws were enacted prior
to 1947. Under the Protocol of Provisional Application for part II
of GATT,135 which includes article VI, the contracting parties are not
strictly bound to provisions which conflict with preexisting national
legislation. Moreover, even good faith adherents to article VI have
interpreted its language in widely diverse fashion. Only the Swedish law
used the exact article VI terminology, "material injury."'31 6 Canada had
no injury requirement at all,13 7 and some countries have easily found
material injury by interpreting the "industry" concept to encompass
only a regional subpart of a larger national production and distribution
pattern.138
B. The International Antidumping Code
At the opening of the Kennedy Round GATT negotiations in 1963
the contracting parties decided to include nontariff barriers on the
agenda of negotiating topics.189 Factors in addition to the ambiguity and
nonbinding character of article VI encouraged focus on antidumping
laws. 40 A number of European countries had become increasingly
alarmed at the manner in which the American antidumping law was
being administered. The United States in turn objected to the absence
of an injury requirement in Canada and to the Star Chamber nature of
European procedures. This latter issue had grown in importance after
1961 when a number of European countries, particularly the United
Kingdom, began to process an increasing number of antidumping
cases.' 4 ' The European Economic Community (EEC) also began to plan
a uniform antidumping regulation for the Common Market countries. 42
Thus there was opportunity at the Kennedy Round for harmonizing
135 61 Stat. A2051 (1947), 55 U.N.T.S. 808 (1950).
186 Royal Ordinance No. 84 of March 29, 1957, quoted in GATT, ANTI-DUMPING
AND COUNTERVAILING DUTES 109 (1958). provided for the levying of duties "in accordance
with the provisions of GATT." This ordinance expired in 1959. The present provision,
Royal Ordinance No. 274 of May 23, 1969, reprinted in GATT, ANT-DUMPING LEGISLA-
TioN, ANTI-DUMPING LAws AND REGULATIONS OF PARTIES TO THE AGREMEN ON TE
IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE VI OF GATT 81 (1970) [hereinafter cited as ANTI-DUMPING
LEGISLATION], neither refers to GATT nor uses the term "material injury."
137 See text accompanying note 111 supra.
188 Cf. GATT, ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES 10 (1961).
139 Rehm, supra note 121, at 427.
.40 See id. at 427-31.
141 See Kelly, supra note 15, at 299-300.
142 See id. at 300.
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antidumping laws while tightening the restrictions against their use for
protectionist ends.
The International Antidumping Code,'43 negotiated technically as
an agreement to elaborate the provisions of GATT article VI, made
no attempt to condemn dumping itself. For the first time an interna-
tional agreement on dumping concerned itself solely with curbing the
protectionist application of antidumping laws.144 The Code focused on
the protectionist potential of both the substantive and procedural pro-
visions of existing legislation.
1. Suppression of Administrative and Procedural Trade Burdens
The Code provisions on administrative and procedural burdens
have three major objectives: (1) to reduce the harassment value of anti-
dumping proceedings; (2) to reduce the penal nature of provisional and
final remedies; and (3) to ensure procedural fairness.
To achieve the first objective the Code requires that government
officials have evidence of both dumping (price discrimination) and in-
jury before initiating formal investigative proceedings.145 This pre-
vents domestic complainants from harassing foreign competition with
a steady barrage of dumping complaints based solely on evidence of
price discrimination, or, as has less often occurred, based solely on evi-
dence of injury. To shorten the overall proceedings, the Code encour-
ages, but does not require, simultaneous investigation of both the price
discrimination and injury questions. 146 Simultaneous consideration of
these questions is mandated only after provisional measures are ap-
plied.147
The Code pursues the second objective, reducing the penal nature
of provisional and final remedies, by allowing provisional remedies to
be assessed against goods under investigation only if there has been an
affirmative "preliminary decision" of price discrimination and if there
is some evidence of injury on hand.148 Provisional remedies may be in
the form of special provisional duties or withholding of appraisement, 149
but they may not normally be applied retroactively to goods entered for
143 See note 10 supra.
144 For a brief discussion of the Code provisions, see K. DATA, supra note 8, at 174-
77; J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 412-24; Rehm, supra note 121, at 431-34. For a more
elaborate discussion of the Code, see Comment, The Kennedy Round GATT Anti-
Dumping Code, 29 U. Prrr. L. REV. 482, 490-514 (1968).
145 Code art. 5(a).
146 Id. art. 5(b).
147 Id.
148 Id. art. 10(a).
149 Id. art. 10(b).
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customs purposes prior to the decision to impose a provisional rem-
edy. 50 In addition, they are expressly limited to a total duration of
three months or, where the foreign supplier and local importer so re-
quest, to six months.' 5 ' The retroactivity of final duties as a general
rule is also limited to the period for which provisional remedies have
been applied.152
Finally the Code ensures procedural openness by requiring national
authorities to notify the foreign supplier and local importer of the
initiation of antidumping proceedings.'58 They must be given an op-
portunity to present written evidence 54 and must be notified of the
final determination, the reasons for the decision, and the criteria used. 55
2. Suppression of Protectionist Interpretation of Substantive Con-
cepts-The Definition of Injury
On the substantive side the Code's treatment of the price discrimina-
tion determination merely elaborates on article VI without significant
change.5 In dealing with the impact of dumped goods in the importing
country market, however, the Code introduces new definitional limits
for the basic concepts of domestic industry, injury, and causation.
It takes a disappointing "escape clause" approach rather than one de-
signed to limit antidumping measures solely to clear cases of anticom-
petitive or predatory dumping. Nevertheless, through high quantitative
standards the Code at least approximates an antitrust test.
a. Domestic Industry. The Code's industry definition is perhaps
most deficient in its treatment of the product market concept, where
the issue is often which domestic products to include for the purpose of
measuring percentage market invasion by dumped imports. Here the
Code borrows from its own terminology in the price discrimination area
to include for injury purposes only the "like product" in the domestic
market. 57 "Like product" is defined as a product "identical, [that is]
alike in all respects to the [dumped] product under consideration."' 58
150 Id. art. 11.
151 Id. art. 10(d).
152 Id. art. 11. In a few narrow cases duties may be assessed on goods entered prior
to this period. Id.
153 Id. art. 6(f.
154 Id. art. 6(a). An oral hearing may also be held "on justification." Id.
'55 Id. art. 6(h).
156 This elaboration takes account of special cases, for example, where goods are
transshipped through a nonprocessing country or where a foreign supplier does not sell
to a local importer at arm's length. See id. art. 2.
'57 Id. art. 4(a).
158 Id. art. 2(b).
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Thus in determining price discrimination it seems appropriate to com-
pare prices only on identical products, but for injury purposes this
definition may result in exaggerating the dumping impact by narrowing
the product market unnecessarily.
In the antitrust field theorists have generally rejected narrow, in-
flexible tests of the product market because of the need to take into
account the substitutability of various related products. 5 9 The central
question is the degree of market power which can be exercised in a
given product line. If, for example, firm R produces red wrapping paper
and firm G green wrapping paper, and consumers are color blind or
otherwise indifferent to the distinction between red and green paper,
it would not be possible to exercise market power in red or green wrap-
ping paper separately. Higher prices for red paper would mean
increased sales of green paper and vice versa. The danger of monopoli-
zation should in this case properly be measured in the wrapping paper
market as a whole. A proper definition of the product market should
therefore include all those domestic products which are substantially
competitive with or close substitutes for the dumped goods.
In defining the geographic market area the Code is more consis-
tent with basic antitrust notions. The general rule equates "domestic
industry" with the "domestic producers as a whole of the like prod-
ucts." 10  Market segmentation is allowed, however, if because of trans-
portation costs or traditional marketing patterns a few producers sell
almost all their output in a limited geographic area and producers in
other parts of the country do not sell to any substantial degree in the
same area.161
The touchstone of these exceptions is the relative market isolation
of the producers in the regional area. Clearly if producers in or near the
competitive market area sell a substantial amount of their production
outside the region, it would seem unreasonable to measure the extent
of injury in terms of sales invasion or price depression in the regional
area alone. A firm selling on a nationwide basis could remain quite
healthy and yet lose an alarmingly large share of a narrow regional mar-
ket. By the same token the existence of substantial regional sales of goods
from distant suppliers also destroys the market isolation premise. In-
jury to local producers would not necessarily portend anticompetitive
159 See generally P. AsmmA, supra note 43, at 127-58; ATORNEY GxNmEAL's ANTI-
TRUSr REPORT 44-45; F. ROWE, supra note 31, at 143-44 SCBHMER 52-57; Brodley, Oligopoly
Power Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts-From Economic Theory to Legal Policy,
19 STAN. L. REv. 285, 350-51 (1967).
160 Code art. 4(a).
161 Id. art. 4(a)ii).
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dangers so long as other domestic suppliers remained strong and viable.
Only in truly isolated markets might injury to competition indeed
occur.
162
b. Material Injury. Rather than adopt an injury to competition
standard,8 3 the Code retains the "material injury" language of article
VI.164 The term "material" is not defined, but the Code suggests that
several factors should be examined, such as market share, profits, em-
ployment, and utilization of capacity in the domestic industry. Two
further factors mentioned at least hint at an anticompetitive standard.
The Code calls for consideration of restrictive trade practices, presum-
ably in the import market, and the extent to which duty paid prices
undercut the domestic level.'1 5 The former consideration suggests con-
cern over oligopolistic price discipline in the market receiving dumped
goods, and the latter a search for predatory intent on the part of the
dumper.
c. Principal Cause. To avoid the imposition of antidumping duties
when general recessionary conditions, nondumped imports, or other
business factors are the real cause of domestic business losses, the Code
provides that dumped imports must be the "principal cause" of do-
mestic injury. 68 There is no elaboration as to precisely what this means,
but the Code suggests that the effects of dumping be compared with all
other adverse factors. Here the influence of "escape clause" reasoning
appears strong. The escape clause in American trade agreements legis-
lation, for example, has traditionally required a substantial cause test
for injury alleged to have resulted from tariff concessions. 167 Indeed,
on the question of linking increased imports with reduced tariffs, the
causality language of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act has at times been
interpreted to require the causal effect of tariff concessions to outweigh
the aggregate of all other possible causes of increased imports. 168 The
Code, which merely says "the authorities shall weigh"'169 dumping
162 See generally text accompanying notes 159-60 supra.
163 See notes 78-79 and accompanying text supra.
164 Code art. 3(a).
165 Id. art. S(b).
166 Id. art 3(a).
167 See TEA § 301(b)(3), 19 U.S.C. § 1901(b)(8) (1970), defining "cause" as being the
"major factor" in causing injury. The prior law, Trade Agreements Extension Act of
1951, ch. 141, § 7, 65 Stat. 74, as amended, Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955,
ch. 169, § 6(a), 69 Stat. 166, defined "cause" as having "contributed substantially towards
causing" injury. See also notes 82-85 and accompanying text supra.
168 See National Tile & Mfg. Co., TEA-F-6, Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 145, at 14
(Dec. 21, 1964) (Culliton, Conm'r); Banner, supra note 85; Metzger, supra note 85, at 269
n.73 (views of former Tariff Comm'n Chairman); Note, supra note 14, at 1434 n.93, 1428.
169 Code art. 3(a).
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against all other factors, does not actually require a preponderance or
aggregate theory result. This might be viewed as too rigid an approach.
Nevertheless, its stress on a higher causality test is well placed, for this
raises the standard for finding injury and sharpens the focus on activity
which might actually threaten predation or lessen competition.
d. International Review of National Interpretations. The Geneva
draftsmen were of course under no illusion that Code terminology
would in itself guarantee nonprotectionist application of national laws.
To guard against errant interpretations, the Code calls for a "Commit-
tee on Anti-Dumping Practices" to meet annually for consultations on
the administration of antidumping laws in the signatory countries.170
Whatever leverage the committee is able to exercise in molding a con-
sistent body of international jurisprudence will rest ultimately on the
reciprocity principle.171 A country which adopts a protectionist interpre-
tation must expect a retaliatory interpretation by other signatory coun-
tries.
IV
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL ANTIDUMPING CODE
A. Implementation of the Code Abroad
In addition to the United States, seventeen countries,172 including
the major trading nations of the Western world and Japan, signed the
Code at Geneva. With the exception of the United States, each of the
170 Id. art. 17. The committee has been formed and continues to meet annually.
See GATT, BAsIC INS RUMENTS AND SEuLcTE DocuasENTs 12 (16th Supp. 1969).
171 See Scace, New Anti-dumping Legislation-Some Problems of Interpretation,
17 CAN. TAX J. 51, 55 (1969). The following observation was made by Mr. R.Y. Grey of
the Canadian Department of Finance:
[A] dearly highly protectionist interpretation by the Canadian Anti-Dumping
Tribunal would be an important argumentation in front of the United States
Tariff Commission when Canadian exporters are accused of dumping in the
United States . . . or in the United Kingdom, for example. And in a certain
sense, jurisprudence will become internationalized because we are operating
under the same Code.
Id., quoting FINANCE CoMMw., HousE OF COMMONS, 28th Parl., 1st Sess., No. 4, zNftUTs 73
(Can. 1968).
172 The signatories are Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzer-
land, the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia. See J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 410 n.25.
The EEC also signed as a separate party to the agreement. Jackson points out that
because of the most favored nation principle of GATT art. I, parties to the Code are
technically obligated to give Code treatment to all GATT members, even those who have
not adhered to the Code. Id. at 410.
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signatories appears to have implemented the Code provisions, in some
cases through new legislation.1 8
In Canada'7 4 and the United Kingdom 75 major statutory revisions
were necessary since neither country had included an injury require-
ment prior to the Code. Although some of the Common Market coun-
tries incorporated the Code directly into their national law,' 76 the most
significant development for these countries was the enactment of a
general antidumping regulation by the Council of the European Com-
munities in April of 1968.177 The new regulation followed the Code
in virtually all respects and, with the expiration of the Rome Treaty's
transitional period on December 31, 1969,178 has now become binding
in all Common Market countries. 7 9 New antidumping legislation en-
acted in Japan in March of 1968180 is less elaborate than the Canadian,
178 See SENATE COMMM. ON FINANCE, 91sr. CONG., IsT. Sss., REPoar OF THE PR~smENT
ON ANTIDUMPING 105-06 (Comm. Print 1969); see also A I-DUMP G IEGISLATION.
174 An Act Respecting the Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duty, CAN. Rlv. STAT. c.
A-15 (1970); see ANTI-DUMPmlo LEGIsLATION 1; Scace, supra note 171. For a discussion of
pre-Code Canadian antidumping law, see MacKenzie, Anti-dumping Duties in Canada,
4 CAN. Y.B. INTL' L. 181 (1966).
175 Customs Duties (Dumping and Subsidies) Act, 1969, c. 16; see ANTS-DuMPING
LEGISLATION 88.
176 E.g., Law of Dec. 28, 1968, [1968] BGB1 II 1188 (Germany).
177 Rtglement (CEE) No. 459/68 du Conseil, JoURNAL OMCIErL DEs COMMUNAUTfu
EUROPAtENNES, April 17, 1968, at 1; see ANTI-DUMPING LEGISLATION 87; 2 A. CAMPsn,
COMMON MARKEr IAw 8671-704 (1969). The regulation covers dumping from non-
EEC countries into the community area. It is thus based on article III of the Rome
Treaty concerning common commercial policy in external trade (Treaty Establishing the
European Economic Community (Common Market), opened for signature March 25, 1957,
[1957] EGB1 II 758 (Germany), 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty]), and
should not be confused with the regulation of intra-EEC dumping. For discussion of the
new EEC regulation, see Beseler, EEC Protection Against Dumping and Market Subsidies
from Third Countries, 6 COMON MARKEr L. REv. 827 (1968); Ehle, Basic Aspects
of the Anti-Dumping Regulations of the Common Market, 3 INT'L LAw. 490 (1969). For a
discussion of European antidumping laws prior to the Code, see Analyses of the Anti-
dumping Laws of the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, and the United King-
dom, 10 ABA INT'L & ComtP. L. BuLL., Dec. 1965, at 14.
178 EEC Treaty art. 8.
179 See Beseler, supra note 177, at 880; Ehle, supra note 177, at 493. During the
transitional period, article 26 of the antidumping regulation allowed the application
of national antidumping laws in limited cases. See Beseler, supra note 177, at 851-52; EhIe,
supra note 177, at 491-93. In one limited area there is disagreement as to whether national
laws might still be applicable. Article 17(1) provides for Community-wide antidumpting
action "where Community interests call for Community action." EEC Treaty art. 17(1).
Ehle reasons that if negative results are reached because of a lack of Community-wide
interest, national antidumping action might still be possible. Eble, supra note 177, at 493.
Beseler takes the position that the EEC regulation has completely displaced national law.
Beseler, supra note 177, at 343 n.97.
180 Customs Tariff Law art. 9, as amended, law No. 5, March 1968, reprinted in
ANTS-DUMPING LEGISIATIoN 78.
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British, and EEC laws but follows their general pattern. All the signifi-
cant Code standards appear to have been satisfied in the new statute and
in the regulations established through a Cabinet Order of July, 1968.181
Experience under the new Code-inspired antidumping laws in
these countries has thus far been sparse, largely because the new legis-
lation has not often been invoked.8 2 The Code's impact in Canada,
however, has already been significant. Under the pre-Code law anti-
dumping duties had been assessed against small quantities of isooctanal
imported into Canada from the United States. In the latest case in-
volving the same chemical from the same source, the Canadian Anti-
dumping Tribunal applied a statutory injury provision for the first
time and dismissed the proceedings on a finding of no injury. 8 This
sanguine picture of domestic reactions to the Code is marred only by
the Code's reception in the United States.
B. Implementation of the Code in the United States
The United States fully adhered to the International Antidumping
Code at Geneva under the President's executive agreement power. The
Code thus became a binding American obligation on its effective date,
July 1, 1968. Since that time the Treasury Deparment has adjusted its
procedures to comply with the Code. By contrast the Tariff Commis-
sion's most recent decisions are totally incompatible with the Code's
injury standards and proceed in a protectionist, anti-Code direction. In
a narrow technical sense both agencies are acting legally because of the
limited effect given to certain kinds of executive agreements in internal
181 Cabinet Order No. 233, July 1968, reprinted in ANTI-DUMPING LEGISLATION 75.
182 The GATT Antidumping Committee has reported the following statistics for
certain Code signatories:
ANTIDUMPING CASES PENDING OR INITIATED
JULY 1, 1969 TO JUNE 30, 1970
Signatory
Category of
Cases US. Canada Denmark EEC Greece Norway U.K.
Cases Pending
July 1, 1969 30 5 0 1 2 2 5
Cases Intiated 23 3 1 0 0 0 6
Between July 1, 1969
and June 30, 1970
GATT, Second Report by the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, Doc. L/3521, April
6, 1971, at 2, 4. The relative frequency of antidumping cases is obviously much greater
in the United States. There were no cases in the signatories not mentioned.
183 See SENATE CoMM. ON FINANCE, supra note 173, at 105.
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American law. At the same time both agencies are free to implement
the Code while remaining faithful to the antidumping act.
1. Legal Status of the Code
The weak position of the Code in internal American law results
primarily from its character as an executive agreement, and in particular
a non-self-executing, inherent power executive agreement. Executive
agreements have binding force equal to treaties in creating international
obligations, 84 but they are not given the same force in internal Ameri-
can law.
The first issue which arises under the question of internal effect
concerns whether an international agreement is executory or self-execu-
ting.8 5 The Antidumping Code is a non-self-executing agreement by
its own terms, since it requires the signatory parties to bring their laws
and regulations into conformity. 86 When it negotiates a non-self-execut-
ing agreement, the executive branch may have three alternative means
of implementation. Congressional legislation, the most common means,
would have established the superiority of the Code over the Act, but
this alternative was unpromising as a means of implementing the Code
because of strong protectionist sentiment in Congress. 87 The executive
branch might instead have argued plausibly that the Code was based on
the power delegated to the President in the Trade Expansion Act of
1962, which authorized American participation in the Kennedy Round.
Implementation could then have been achieved through the President's
special proclamation power authorized in that Act. 8 But the delegating
language in the 1962 Act was weak; it merely authorized reduction of
"existing duty or other import restriction."' 89 Moreover, a number of
congressmen argued strongly that there was no authority for the Code
in the 1962 Act.8 0 Thus the executive branch decided to base the Code
184 RLESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw §§ 142-44 (1965). See generally
W. McCLuRE, INTERNATONAL ExEcuTvE AGREEMENTS (1941); McDougal & Lans, Treaties
and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments
of National Policy, pts. 1 & 2, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 534 (1945).
185 International agreements may be non-self-executing because of a constitutional
requirement, because of the generality of the agreement's provisions, or because those
provisions indicate that implementing legislation of some kind is contemplated. See
R rATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LA.W §§ 14145 (1965).
186 Code art. 14.
187 See Rehm, supra note 121, at 430.
188 TEA § 201(a)(2), 19 US.C. § 1821(a)(2) (1970).
189 Id.
190 See S. Con. Res. 38, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CoNG. REC. 20,916 (1967), reprinted
in Hearings on the International Antidumping Code Before the Senate Comm. on Finance,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Code Hearings]; see also T. CutTIs &
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on the President's inherent authority in foreign affairs. 191 Implementa-
tion was presumably expected through the administrative decisions of
the Treasury and Tariff Commission.
The second issue arising under the question of internal effect
concerns the power of an international agreement to override incon-
sistent domestic statutes. Treaties and executive agreements entered
pursuant to congressionally delegated authority follow the "later in
date" rule of priority, 92 but there is authority for denying that effect to
an executive agreement based exclusively on the constitutional power of
the President.198 Thus the inherent power theory urged by the executive
branch as the basis for the Code was counterproductive on the question
of supremacy of the Code over the 1921 Act. Through title II of the
Renegotiation Amendments Act of 1968,-1 Congress dispelled any
doubts over the supremacy question. It instructed the Treasury and
Tariff Commission to "resolve any conflict between the International
Antidumping Code and the Antidumping Act, 1921, in favor of the Act
as applied by the agency administering the Act."'19 5
2. Freedom of the Treasury and Tariff Commission To Imple-
ment the Code
Title II of the Renegotiation Amendments Act was a product in
part of the larger executive-legislative struggle for power in foreign
affairs of the late 1960's,196 and in part of the protectionist sentiment in
J. VASTINE, supra note 16, at 208-10; S. REs'. No. 1385, pt. 2, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968);
S. REP. No. 1341, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1966), reprinted in Code Hearings 7-8; Long,
supra note 35, at 469.
Legal commentators have also argued that the Code was not authorized by the Trade
Expansion Act. See Anthony, supra note 9, at 179 n.57; Shannon & Marx, The Inter-
national Anti-Dumping Code and United States Antidumping Law-An Appraisal, 7
COLUM. J. TRANSNA'iL L. 171, 175-81 (1968). Both arguments rest heavily on a statement
in a Senate report accompanying the 1962 Act: "Other laws not intended to be affected
include the Antidumping Act .... " S. REP'. No. 2059, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1962). How-
ever, there was no such statement in the corresponding House report (H.R. REP. No.
1818, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1962)) and the statutory language, "other import restrictions,"
is broad enough to encompass the Code.
191 SPECrAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR TRADE NEGOTIATIONs, MEMRANDUM, Aug. 17, 1966,
reprinted in 112 CONG. Rxc. 20,412 (1966).
192 See REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF FOREIGN RErxroNs LAw §§ 141-43 (1965).
198 See id. § 144; see also United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir.
1953), aff'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955).
194 Renegotiation Amendments Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-634, tit. 1I, 82 Stat. 1347,
19 U.S.C. § 160 note (1970).
195 Id. § 201(a)(1), 82 Stat. 1347, 19 U.S.C. § 160 note (1970).
196 The seriousness with which the separation of powers issue was viewed is reflected
in the statements of Senator Hartke on the floor of the Senate:
These men [various senators and representatives supporting Senator Hartke's
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Congress.197 In fact, the bill as it emerged from the Senate would have
completely prohibited the Treasury and Tariff Commission from
implementing the Code provisions.198 Liberal trade interests in the
House forced a compromise by the conference committee, so that the
final version of the 1968 Act carries a distinctly neutral cast.199 The
supremacy of the Act is assured, but the Treasury and Tariff Commis-
sion are not prohibited from carrying the Code into effect as long as
basic consistency with the Act is maintained.
The real issue is one of interpretation, not of priority of legal
norms. The Act is drafted in broad terms. I have shown, for example,
that the Tariff Commission must decide "whether an industry in the
United States is being or is likely to be injured.., by reason of the im-
portation of [dumped goods]." 20 The Code on the other hand gives a
detailed definition of an industry, requires injury to be material, and
adds a principal cause standard. The Act's broad terms and the Code's
narrow terms do not "conflict"; the issue is whether it is proper to give
a Code interpretation to the Act.
Prior to the passage of the Renegotiation Amendments Act one
could have argued that the Code had an indirect binding effect on the
Treasury and Tariff Commission. They are after all administrative
agencies, and the President had entered an international agreement
obligating the United States to interpret and apply its law according to
the guidelines set forth in the Code. The President's authority would
have been clearer, perhaps, over the Treasury than over the Commis-
sion. The Commission could be viewed for some purposes-and espe-
position] recognize not only the specific economic problem [of international
dumping practices] but also the transcendent problem. A problem that could
have most serious effects on the nature and future course of the Republic. A
problem that has seen full flower in the Tonkin Bay Resolution, the Canadian-
American Auto Parts Agreement, the Defense Department's refusal to build two
nuclear frigates as specifically directed .... The list goes on and on. But in the
Anti-Dumping Code we have reached a new plateau.
113 CONG. REc. 20,915 (1967).
197 See 114 CONG. REc. 26,131-33 (1968) (remarks of Senator Hartke). Although
Senator Hartke disclaims protectionism as the purpose for title H1, the less liberal treat-
ment proposed by the Senate discloses protectionist sentiments. See also Rehm, supra note
121, at 480.
198 See 114 CONG. REc. 29,888 (1968) (remarks of Senator Long discussing the Con-
ference Report on the 1968 Act); Pintos & Murphy, Congress Dumps the International
Antidumping Code, 18 CATH. U.L. REV. 180, 188 (1968).
199 See CoNF. REP. No. 1951, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); 114 CONG. REc. 80,607 (1968)
(remarks of Congressman Boggs discussing the Conference Report on the 1968 Act);
T. Cuaris & J. vSriNE, supra note 16, at 212-23; see also note 195 and accompanying text
supra.
200 Antidumping Act § 201(a), 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970).
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cially in the antidumping field where it makes final determinations-as
an independent agency201 responsible primarily to Congress.
Congress addressed this problem directly in the 1968 Renegotiation
Amendments Act by providing: "Nothing contained in the Interna-
tional Antidumping Code... shall be construed to restrict the discretion
of the . . . Tariff Commission in performing its duties and functions
under the Antidumping Act .... ,,202 At one point the 1968 Act has the
appearance of implementing legislation since it directs the two agencies
to "take into account the provisions of the International Antidumping
Code. ' 203 But it states they are to do so "only insofar as [the Code
provisions] are consistent with the Antidumping Act, 1921, as applied
by the agency administering the Act. '" 2 4 Thus the Treasury and
Commission retain full discretion to interpret the 1921 Act in accor-
dance with the Code or contrary to it. The Renegotiation Amend-
ments Act leaves unanswered the fundamental question of how these
agencies should interpret the Act.
There is of course no single, rigid approach to statutory interpreta-
tion. Weight must be given to the plain meaning of words, to legislative
history, to the purpose of the statute, and to past interpretations. On
each of these approaches, however, interpreting the Antidumping Act
poses difficulties.
First, as to the meaning of words, I have shown that the language
is broad and hence subject to differing interpretations, depending upon
whether a protectionist or antitrust character is ascribed to it.
Second, as to legislative history, the background of the Antidump-
ing Act is confused, with both protectionist and antitrust strands in the
fabric.205 The Act was passed in a recessionary period 20 6 as title II of the
201 See Bronz, supra note 85; see also Metzger, New Roles for the U.S. Tariff Cor-
mission, 1 LAw & POLICY INT'L Bus. 1 (1969).
202 Renegotiation Amendments Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-634, § 201(a), 82 Stat.
1347, 19 U.S.C. § 160 note (1970).
203 Id. § 201(a)(2). Congressman Boggs asserted this view on the floor of the House:
It is dear to me, as a conferee who participated in every discussion on this issue,
that title II constitutes congressional recognition of the . . . Code. That is,
instead of rejecting the code, it accepts it. It is noteworthy, for example, that
subsection (a)(2) expressly directs both the Treasury Department and the Tariff
Commission to take the code into account in administering the act. Moreover,
subsection (b)(2) dearly envisages that the code will be applied by both ad-
ministering agencies. This means, in effect, that the code is given a statutory status.
114 CONG. REc. 30,607 (1968).
204 Renegotiation Amendments Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-634, § 201(a)(1), 82 Stat.
1347, 19 U.S.C. § 160 note (1970).
205 For discussion of the legislative history of the 1921 Antidumping Act, see Coudert,
supra note 9, at 190-92; Ehrenhaft, supra note 9, at 44-49; Comment, supra note 9, at
714-15.
206 See 61 CONG. RFc. 1020-21 (1921) (remarks of Senator McCumber).
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1921 Emergency Tariff Act,20 T which was designed to protect farmers
from low priced imports. The antidumping title may even have been a
sop to industrialists to prevent them from opposing higher agricultural
tariffs.208 It imposed a tariff remedy against offending goods, rejecting
the antitrust remedies against offending suppliers provided for under
the Revenue Act of 1916.209 The Act has been administered by Customs
officials and, since 1954, in part by the Tariff Commission.210 Each of
these features suggests a protectionist design.
On the other hand the Act plainly condemns only sales "below fair
value," and the duty levied is fixed at the amount of discrimination in
price. Alleged predatory pricing by European cartels, particularly the
German chemical firms, was clearly presented to Congress as the danger
against which the law was designed to protect.211 A tariff remedy was
preferred because of the difficulty in obtaining personal jurisdiction
over foreign suppliers and of proving intent to monopolize under the
1916 Act.2 12 The task of injury determination was transferred to the
Tariff Commission in 1954 because of its expertise, staff, and facili-
ties,218 not because of a more protectionist interpretation of the statute.
Third, as to statutory purpose, the only reason supported by
economic theory for giving dumped imports less liberal treatment than
other imports is to protect against the threat of predation. 214 The
domestic Robinson-Patman Act opposes only competition-lessening
price discrimination, and there seems no reason to take a more severe
view of price discrimination in international trade. Nevertheless, the
Antidumping Act language calls for action against dumped goods which
cause injury to "an industry in the United States." 215 This language is
at least open to the interpretation that nonpredatory, injurious dump-
ing is proscribed, however inconsistent this may be with liberal trade
theory.
Fourth, as to the principle of stare decisis, past interpretations of
207 42 Stat. 9, 11 (1921).
208 See 61 CONG. REc. 1098 (1921) (remarks of Senator Simmons); see also 61 CONG.
Rrc. 1297 (1921) (remarks of Senator Stanley, in which he characterizes the antidumping
law as a "universal price accelerator").
209 39 Stat. 798, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1970). See text accompanying note 102 supra.
210 See note 122 and accompanying text supra.
211 See 61 CONG. REc. 262 (1921) (remarks of Representative Fordney); 61 CONG. REc.
1021-22 (1921) (remarks of Senator McCumber).
212 See U.S. TARFF Comrna'N, REPORT: DUMPING AND UNFAIR COMPErTTON 18, 20-21
(1919).
213 See S. REP. No. 2326, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1954); Hearings on HR. 9476 Before
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 3941 (1954) [hereinafter cited
as Hearings on HR. 9476].
214 See notes 29-77 and accompanying text supra.
215 Antidumping Act § 201(a), 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970).
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the Act by the Treasury and Tariff Commission-especially by the
latter-have not been consistent. The Commission has in fact never
felt the need strictly to follow stare decisis.21 6 As we will discuss later,
most of its past decisions bear an "escape clause" cast, but in general
have wavered noticeably with the changing membership of the Com-
mission.
Because the Code has now become an international guideline for
antidumping measures, the Commission would do well to give it con-
siderable weight. The important point here is that irrespective of the
supremacy question, the 1968 Renegotiation Amendments Act does not
prevent either the Treasury or the Tariff Commission from interpret-
ing the Act in such a way as to maintain consistency with the Code. The
ifundamental question is whether the 1921 Act is to be given a pro-
tectionist or antitrust interpretation. An enlightened approach would
insist on an antitrust interpretation of the Act. A more politically
cautious approach might dictate an "escape clause" interpretation.
Either would maintain consistency between the Code and the Act.
3. Treasury Implementation of the Code in Price Discrimination
Determinations
From the outset the Treasury Department assumed that the Code
was consistent with existing United States law. Thus it willingly sought
to implement the Code provisions by promulgating new amendments to
its antidumping regulations.217 These became effective July 1, 1968, the
same date on which the Antidumping Code went into effect. These
amendments represented an effort to reduce the harassment value of
antidumping proceedings and to remove the penal character of some
aspects of withholding of appraisement and assessment of final duties.
The Code provisions required no significant changes in preexisting
American standards for determining price discrimination and for fair
and open proceedings.
The new regulations have sought to curb the harassment value of
investigations and the penal nature of remedies in three major ways:
(1) by requiring evidence of injury and price discrimination before
initiating an investigation; (2) by shortening the overall length of the
proceedings, and especially of the period during which appraisement is
withheld; and (3) by reducing or eliminating retroactivity of withhold-
ing of appraisement and assessment of final duties. Critics of the Code
216 See Hendrick, supra note 47, at 924.
217 19 C.F.R. §§ 153.1-.64 (1971). For an excellent discussion of the new regulations,
see Anthony, supra note 9, at 177-98.
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have argued that with each of these changes the new regulations violate
the Antidumping Act.218 If one bears in mind the proper objective of
antidumping laws, this criticism seems unfounded.
a. Simultaneous Consideration of Injury and Price Discrimination.
The Code requires that
evidence of both dumping [price discrimination] and injury shall
be considered simultaneously in the decision whether or not to
initiate an investigation, and thereafter, during the course of the
investigation, starting on a date not later than the earliest date on
which provisional measures may be applied .... 219
To comply with these provisions the 1968 regulations require an
industry representative to submit with the original complaint "informa-
tion indicating that an industry in the United States is being injured, or
is likely to be injured. '220
Superficially this appears to conflict with the American procedure
established in 1954 when the task of injury determination was trans-
ferred from the Treasury to the Tariff Commission. Thus Code op-
ponents argue that the Secretary of the Treasury has exceeded his
authority by requiring information bearing on injury in the initial
complaint. This seems an excessively narrow view. Even under pre-Code
and post-1954 regulations the Treasury had required injury information
in the original complaint.221 Surely the Treasury must have the discre-
tion to require such information, to avoid harassing importers with
unfounded complaints and to avoid incurring the expense and wasted
time involved in a futile determination of price discrimination. If
need be, statutory authority might be found in the Treasury's complete
discretion to initiate an investigation in the first place22 or in its final
authority to impose antidumping duties.223
A more important question is how substantial the injury informa-
tion must be to meet the test of the 1968 regulations. A full scale
Treasury investigation into injury would dearly invade the prerogative
of the Commission. The Code, however, does not require an extensive
investigation into the injury question at the initiation stage. It merely
218 See S. REP. No. 1885, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 (1968); Long, supra note 35, at
480; Shannon & Marx, supra note 190, at 185-90; Comment, supra note 144, at 498-512,
514-15; see also Anthony, supra note 9, at 186-93 (objecting to simultaneous withholding
and less than fair value determinations).
219 Code art. 5(b).
220 19 C.F.R. § 153.27(e) (1971).
221 See 19 C.F.R. § 14.6(b)(3) (1967) (requiring information as to total volume and
value of competing domestic production), repealed, 19 C.F.R. § 158 (1971).
222 Antidumping Act § 201(a), 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970).
223 Id. § 202(a), 19 U.S.C. § 161(a) (1970).
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requires that evidence of injury be considered "in the decision whether
or not to initiate an investigation.1224 A Treasury spokesman has
asserted that the pre-Code standard, which aimed solely at avoiding
frivolous and harassing investigations, has been retained.22 5 The large
number of minimally injurious cases which the Treasury has thus far
forwarded to the Commission suggests that this standard has at least
not been toughened.2 26
b. Limiting the Duration of Withholding of Appraisement. An-
other aspect of the simultaneity issue arises from other Code provisions.
The last phrase of the Code language quoted above appears to require
full scale simultaneity only after provisional measures are applied,
which for the United States means after appraisement is withheld. The
Code limits the total duration of provisional measures to three months;
however, on request of the local importer and foreign exporter this
period may be extended to six months. 227 If the six-month option is
exercised, the Code removes the requirement of simultaneous investiga-
tions after provisional remedies are taken.228 These exceptional provi-
sions add the necessary flexibility for maintaining consistency between
the Code and the Act. The Treasury Regulations have taken advantage
of them by providing separate three-month 29 and six-month proce-
dures.2 0
Under pre-Code procedures23' the Treasury regularly withheld
appraisement after a preliminary, tentative finding of "less than fair
value" (LTFV) sales. Formal proceedings continued, however, until a
final determination was reached. The new three-month procedure of the
1968 regulations contemplates that the decision to withhold appraise-
ment and final determination of LTFV sales will be made "concur-
rently." The final LTFV determination triggers the Tariff Commission
investigation which, under the Act, must be completed within three
months. If the finding is positive, antidumping duties are imposed; if
negative, the case is dismissed. In either case withholding will cease and
the three-month limitation on its duration will have been met.
224 Code art. 5(b).
225 See Code Hearings 84-40 (remarks of Fred Smith, General Counsel, U.S.
Treasury Dep't).
226 See text accompanying notes 283-93 infra.
227 Code art. 10(d).
228 Id. art. 5(b).
229 19 C.F.R. § 153.34(a) (1971).
230 Id. § 153.34(b).
231 See generally Hendrick, Administration of the U.S. Antidumping Act-Procedures
and Policies, in CoMPxNum 156.
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Code critics have challenged 2 2 the concurrence of the decision to
impose withholding with the final determination that LTFV sales are
involved. The language of the Act seems to require withholding as
soon as "the Secretary has reason to believe or suspect" 21 price dis-
crimination, and hence before he would ordinarily make a final de-
termination of LTFV sales. But even on this reading of the Act, the
1968 regulations cannot be faulted for not withholding appraisement
soon enough. The language of the regulations closely follows that of the
Act by calling for withholding "[i]f... there are reasonable grounds to
believe or suspect that any merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold
at less than its foreign market value."2 4
Of course one might object that proceedings which are ripe for
withholding are premature for a final LTFV determination. The
foreign exporter and local importer are, however, the parties primarily
injured by a premature positive finding of price discrimination, and the
six-month option offers them an adequate remedy. For cases in which
the ultimate outcome is seriously in doubt even after a withholding
decision, the exporter and importer may request three additional
months within which to contest the LTFV question.2 5 During this
three-month period appraisement will be withheld and there will be no
consideration of the injury question by the Tariff Commission. If at the
end of this first three-month period the Treasury makes a final positive
determination of LTFV sales, the case then goes to the Tariff Commis-
sion for its three-month injury investigation, during which appraise-
ment continues to be withheld for a total of six months.
In sum, objections to the modicum of simultaneity and the
shortened withholding periods under the 1968 regulations are not even
technically well founded. Moreover, lengthened proceedings would
only serve protectionist ends. Congress transferred the injury determina-
tion to the Tariff Commission because of its expertise in injury findings,
not for the purpose of insulating the price discrimination and injury
decisions or of lengthening the overall proceedings. Congress's imposi-
tion of the three-month limit on the Commission's decision shows its
concern over lengthy proceedings. The Treasury Department's effort to
shorten the proceedings is thus commendable and seemingly consistent
with congressional intent2 36
232 See Anthony, supra note 9, at 188-90.
233 Antidumping Act § 201(b); 19 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970).
234 19 C.F.R. § 153.34(a) (1971).
235 Id. § 153.34(b).
230 It should be noted that the "Trade Act of 1971" introduced in the Senate (S. 4,
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c. Curbing Retroactivity. Under the Antidumping Act, once a
decision is reached to withhold appraisement, it may be applied to all
unappraised goods entered for customs purposes during a period begin-
ning 120 days before the question of dumping was first raised.23r As a
practical matter this provision affected goods whose appraisement had
been delayed for fortuitous reasons or reasons unrelated to dumping.
Because of the obvious inequity of retroactive withholding, however,
the pre-Code Treasury regulations provided for it in very few cases. 238
The Code now prohibits all retroactive application of provisional
measures, 39 and the 1968 Treasury regulations have complied with this
requirement. Thus appraisement will generally be withheld only on
goods entered after the decision to withhold has been made.2 40 Since
the 1921 Act merely authorizes but does not plainly require retroactive
withholding there seems little ground to question the validity of the
new procedure. Indeed, the 120-day provision was originally introduced
by a 1954 amendment to the Act241 to curtail what had been the Trea-
sury Department's unlimited discretion prior to that time to apply
withholding retroactively.
The Act does, however, require a degree of retroactivity in the
assessment of final antidumping duties, and the Code has been drafted
in a transparent attempt to comply with the American statute. The Code
allows retroactive application of duties (1) upon goods entered after the
withholding decision and (2) upon goods entered prior to that decision
if the reason they have not been appraised is unrelated to dumping.242
The Act calls for the assessment of antidumping duties against all
dumped goods which have been entered for customs purposes but which
remain unappraised at the time of final injury determination. 243 Goods
will fall into this category only if they have been subject to a withhold-
ing decision or if appraisement has not been made for some other
unrelated reason-the two exceptions of the Code.
92d Cong., 1st Sess.) and House (H.R. 20, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.) in January 1971 sought to
limit the determination time to four months. S. 4, H.R. 20, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., tit. III,
ch. I (Amendments to the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws).
237 19 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970).
238 See Conner & Buschlinger, supra note 9, at 129.
239 Code art. 11.
240 19 C.F.R. § 153.48(a) (1971). The provisions of this section allow the Commissioner
of Customs to specify a different effective date for withholding, but there is nothing to
indicate that retroactivity is intended.
241 Customs Simplification Act of 1954, ch. 1213, § 301, 68 Stat. 1188, 19 U.S.C.
§ 160(b) (1970).
242 Code arts. 11(i), (ii).
243 19 US.C. § 161(a) (1970).
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d. Treasury's Departure from Code Standards on Price Assurances.
Only in the area of price assurances has the Treasury apparently altered
its general policy of implementing the Code. Under pre-Code practice
and under the original version of the 1968 regulations, the Treasury
Department broadly authorized the termination of dumping investiga-
tions if a foreign dumper gave what are called "price assurances"-a
guarantee not to discriminate in price in the future or to cease ship-
ments altogether.244 In a recent amendment to the 1968 regulations
stricter requirements have been imposed. Proceedings will be termi-
nated on the basis of price assurances only where the dumping margin is
considered "minimal in relation to the total volume of sales." 24 5 The
Code encourages a more liberal approach to price assurances.2 46
Although it is difficult to characterize the thrust of the Treasury
Department's change, there will dearly be some trade restricting effects.
Anti-Code writers have objected to the number of past dismissals based
on price assurances,247 although the only reason given for opposing
dismissal has been the need to counter "hit and run dumping." 248 This
term seems misapplied. The threat that a predatory dumper could dump
up to the point of withholding, cease the practice under price assurances,
and then dump again at a later time seems slight. As long as price as-
surances are faithfully observed, as they apparently always have been,
the remedy sought by antidumping legislation will have been achieved.
Refusal to dismiss the proceedings would seem to suggest a desire to
penalize the local importer or foreign exporter for goods sold at dump-
ing prices and entered prior to the price revision. 24 9 The new Treasury
policy may thus encourage all exporters of significant size to resolve
doubtful pricing questions in an upward direction. Mistaken assump-
tions as to what the Treasury Department will allow can no longer be
244 19 C.F.R. § 14.7(b)(9) (1967) (pre-Code); 19 C.F.R. § 53.15 (1969) (post-Code),
amended, 19 C.F.R. § 153.15 (1971). See Hendrick, supra note 231, at 166-67.
245 Discontinuance of Antidumping Regulations-Customs Regulations Amended,
35 Fed. Reg. 8275 (Treas. 1970). See Hearings on Tariff and Trade Proposals Before House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 522 (1970) (remarks of Eugene Rossides).
246 Code art. 7. The new Treasury Department procedure is not strictly a violation
of the Code since article 7 merely suggests, but does not require, that proceedings be dis-
missed on receipt of price assurances.
247 See Long, supra note 35, at 480-81; Code Hearings 81 (remarks of Senator Long,
Chairman, Senate Finance Committee).
248 See Titanium Dioxide from Japan, 31 Fed. Reg. 3198 (Treas. 1966) (refusal to
accept price revision).
249 See Hendrick, supra note 231, at 166; Code Hearings 81 (remarks of Senator Long).
Members of the GATT Antidumping Committee (see note 170 and accompanying text
supra) have objected to the new Treasury procedure as "inconsistent with the spirit of the
Code" and "punitive in intent." GATT, supra note 182, at 1.
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corrected after the fact by price assurances, at least not if a substantial
volume of imports is involved.
A liberal price assurances procedure is not in itself a wholly un-
mixed blessing. It can have a serious protectionist effect by encouraging
exporters to raise prices rather than risk an injury determination. The
extent of this protectionist effect depends largely upon the character
and reasonableness of the standards of injury applied.
4. The Tariff Commission's Failure To Implement the Code in
Injury Determinations
In contrast to the Treasury Department, the Tariff Commission
from the outset has taken a hostile view of the Code. In a report
prepared for the Senate Finance Committee in June, 1967, a majority
of the Commission concluded that the Code provisions on injury were
inconsistent with the 1921 Antidumping Act.250 The real issue as I
have pointed out, however, is one of interpretation of the elastic clauses
of the Act, not consistency in a strict sense.
The fairest characterization of the Code is that it takes essentially
an escape clause approach to dumping injury. The most distressing
aspect of the Commission's recent injury decisions is not that they have
rejected a strict antitrust approach to the dumping question, a result
which is objectionable in its own right, but that they appear even to
have departed from the domestic escape clause approach of pre-Code
days, which would have allowed the United States to have joined the
pragmatic international consensus represented by the Code.
Admittedly, such conclusions are not easy to draw because of the
imprecision of Code concepts such as material injury or principal cause,
and because of the erratic nature of the Commission's decisions. But an
examination of the Commission's post-Code decisions clearly indicates
a sharp movement away from its traditional standards in a more re-
strictionist, anti-Code direction. If continued, the Commission's new
decisional trend will probably destroy the Code as an expression of
international consensus.
In the following discussion I shall consider the Commission's
250 SENATE Comm. ON FINANCE, REPORT OF THE U.. TARIFF COMMISSION ON S. CON.
R s. 38, REGARDING THE INTERNATIONAL ANTIDUMPING CODE, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-48
(Comm. Print 1967) [hereinafter cited as TARIFF COMM'N CODE REPORT]. In a minority
report then Chairman Metzger and Commissioner Thunberg found no inconsistency on
the face of the Code. They felt the issue would have to be resolved on a case-by-case
basis. Id. at 49-60.
For the opinion of commentators that the Code and Act are inconsistent in the
injury area, see Long, supra note 35; Pintos & Murphy, supra note 198, at 189-91; Shannon
& Marx, supra note 190.
[Vol. 57:491
HeinOnline -- 57 Cornell L. Rev. 544 1971-1972
ANTIDUMPING LAWS
post-Code approach to the three operative concepts of an injury de-
termination contained in both the Act and the Code: the definition of
domestic industry, the amount of injury required, and the degree of
causal nexus between dumped imports and injury. I shall also examine
the Commission's lack of sensitivity to the procompetitive effects of
dumping practices, although this is not directly related to the question
of implementing the Code.
a. Domestic Industry. The Commission's recent treatment of the
domestic industry concept reflects a problem which pre-dated the Code:
the absence of a clear rationale for including or excluding closely related
products in the product market definition. This has allowed the Com-
mission to narrow the market definition almost at will so as to enlarge
the apparent importance of dumped imports. Unfortunately, as noted,251
the Code provides no remedy here. It defines the product market for
injury purposes to include only domestic products "identical" to
dumped imports, 252 and thus encourages a narrow approach. The
Commission's recent decisions are thus not strictly in violation of the
Code.
A proper antitrust view of the product market question would
group within a single industry all those domestic products which are
close substitutes for one another and for the dumped goods in question:
in other words, those for which the cross elasticity of demand is high.
One might also wish to take account of production processes to assess
the ease of changeover in production from one product to another. The
central notion is the ability of competitors to prevent a predator from
exercising excessive market power in a given product line.
Only if the objective is to protect individual competitors will
accounting categories or physical characteristics alone suffice to identify
the product market. Narrow definition of the product market can be a
highly convenient protectionist weapon. If, for example, there is no
domestic product identical to imported orange wrapping paper, one
might measure its impact on the nearest "identical" product, red wrap-
ping paper, setting aside green, blue, and yellow paper. Such narrowing
can protect a single domestic firm producing red wrapping paper or the
red paper line of a large number of otherwise healthy and prosperous
multiproduct paper firms.
In its escape clause decisions of the late 1950's the Tariff Com-
mission often favored a narrow approach to the product market ques-
251 See notes 157-59 and accompanying text supra.
252 Code arts. 2(b), 3, 4(a).
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tion.253 This approach was generally carried over into the antidumping
field,254 although none of the early cases seems quite so restrictive as
recent Commission decisions.2 55 Two recent decisions, Pig Iron from
East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Romania & the U.S.S.R.256 and Tele-
vision Receiving Sets from Japan,257 are particularly illustrative of a
narrow approach.
In the Pig Iron case the imports in question consisted almost ex-
clusively of basic grade and foundry grade pig iron. There appears to
be little competition between the two grades since the former is used in
steel making, the latter in the production of cast iron products, and
since the two axe not interchangeable for these purposes. The imports
were all of the cold ingot variety in both grades, whereas a very large
proportion of domestic production of basic and foundry grade pig iron
remains in a molten state for captive use by integrated steel firms and
iron foundries.
Because of steadily falling prices of scrap metal in recent years, it
has been increasingly substituted for foundry grade pig iron in the iron
casting process. Indeed scrap metal appeared to be the predominant
cause of the difficulties experienced in the merchant pig iron market.
In any event, it was clear that the cross elasticity of demand between
foundry grade pig iron and scrap metal, which are almost perfect
substitutes in the iron casting process, was very high. Thus on a market
power theory it would have been reasonable to have included in the
definition of the product market foundry grade pig iron (molten and
cold) and scrap metal. Imports of the basic grade might have been
categorized as a separate product line consisting of cold and molten
basic grade pig iron needed for producing steel.
The Commission chose, however, to narrow the product market to
cold basic and cold foundry grade pig iron.258 This definition included
253 See Bron, supra note 85, at 472-75.
254 See Baier, supra note 9, at 427-28; Bronz, supra note 85, at 473-74; Hendrick,
supra note 231, at 175.
255 For very narrow approaches to the product market among pre-Code decisions,
however, see Tissue Paper from Norway, 23 Fed. Reg. 8892 (Tariff Comm'n 1958) (directly
comparable items); Plastic Baby Carriers from Japan, 29 Fed. Reg. 13,990 (Tariff Comm'n
1964) (carriages with specific accessories).
256 33 Fed. Reg. 14,664 (Tariff Comm'n 1968).
257 36 Fed. Reg. 4576 (Tariff Comm'n 1971).
258 The dissenting commissioners in the Pig Iron case, then Chairman Metzger and
Commissioner Thunberg, seemed unwilling to exclude molten or "captive" pig iron from
the market definition. The question was not squarely presented, however, since both
commissioners found no injury even on the excessively narrow market definition chosen
by the majority. Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 265, at 27 (Metzger, Chairman, dissenting); id.
at 43 (Thunberg, Comm'r, dissenting). Chairman Metzger's dissent contains the only
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both grades of imported pig iron but excluded scrap metal and the large
domestic production of molten pig iron. The Commission was thus able
to exaggerate the degree of market penetration to a maximum of 12.4
percent. There appears to be no basis for fearing that market power
could have been exercised in cold basic and cold foundry grade pig iron.
Higher domestic prices for these products would simply mean greater
domestic production and sales of molten pig iron and scrap metal.
In Television Sets from Japan the Commission initially used
broad strokes to include in the definition of industry the twenty or so
domestic firms which produce both monochrome and color television
sets in a wide range of screen sizes. Thereafter, however, it measured
market invasion only by the market for the middle screen sizes. Appar-
ently American producers completely dominate the production of large
screen sets, while Japanese producers offer stiff competition in the mid-
dle screen sizes. It may be that the cross elasticity of demand between
middle and large size sets, both monochrome and color, is sufficiently
low to permit the exercise of significant market power in middle
screen sizes alone, but the Commission failed to address this point. In
fact there was no mention at all of reduced profits in middle screen
sizes or of inability of domestic firms to shift easily into greater pro-
duction of middle sized sets.
The Commission has also adopted a narrow definition of the
geographic market. Although in its pre-Code decisions the Tariff
Commission often measured injury in narrow regional areas, 259 it
generally did so on principles fully consistent with the present Code
guidelines.260 The Code allows market segmentation where either high
transport costs or traditional marketing patterns genuinely isolate
producers in distinct geographic areas.261 Producers included in the
market must sell a high percentage of their output in the area in ques-
tion, and other national producers must not regularly make penetration
sales in this area.
In the Portland Cement cases262 of the early 1960's the high
reference to the Antidumping Code to be found in a formal Tariff Commission opinion.
Metzger found the Code inapplicable because the nations involved, except for Czecho-
slovalda, were nonsignatories and nonmembers of GATT. Id. at 27 n.1. Although Czecho-
slovakia had adhered to the Code, Metzger relied upon an earlier GATT waiver granted
the United States with respect to its GATT obligations to Czechoslovakia. Id.
259 See Note, supra note 9, at 721 n.70.
260 For a discussion of pre-Code geographic segmentation cases, see Coudert, supra
note 9, at 190, 213-16.
201 Code art. 4(a)(i), (ii).
262 Portland Cement from Dominican Republic, 28 Fed. Reg. 4047 (Tariff Comm'n
1963); Portland Cement from Dominican Republic, 27 Fed. Reg. 3872 (Tariff Comm'n
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transportation cost of bulky, low value cement had led to the concentra-
tion of cement plants in specific market areas. The Commission thus
measured injury in these isolated areas. In contrast, lower transporta-
tion costs and a history of market interpenetration resulted in a broader
definition of the geographic market in the 1963 Steel Wire Rod cases.2 3
In the Commission's post-Code decisions geographic market defini-
tion has not played a large role. But as the recent Steel Bars & Shapes
from Australia2 decision indicates, geographic segmentation is always
available, especially in industries with high transport costs, to magnify
the appearance of injury. In Bars & Shapes imports were entered at
West, Gulf, and East Coast ports. Despite strong evidence of a nation-
wide price structure for these products,265 the Commission measured
injury to the narrow Northwest market, which included the states
of Oregon and Washington, in which three domestic firms made sales.
One of the three was a national firm with national sales, and only one of
the two regional firms was a complainant. At their peak level in 1968,
LTFV imports amounted to only 5.5 percent of the consumption in
Washington and Oregon. On a national basis the figure was 0.5 percent.
The majority based its segmentation decision on the existence of
high transport costs and cited two controversial 1964 decisions involving
steel bars and shapes from Canada.260 Vigorous dissents in those cases
had challenged the existence of a recognizable market area for steel bars
and shapes in the Northwest because there was evidence of widespread
interpenetration in that market from other parts of the country.267 The
majority in Bars & Shapes from Australia made no effort to support a
theory of market isolation, and rested instead on the breathtakingly
simplistic notion that "injury to a part of the national industry is an
injury to the whole industry."268 Because of what appears to have been
minimal business interference with perhaps only one firm, and at the
1962); Portland Cement from Portugal, 26 Fed. Reg. 10,010 (Tariff Comm'n 1961); Portland
Cement from Belgium, 26 Fed. Reg. 5102 (Tariff Comm'n 1961); Portland Cement from
Sweden, 26 Fed. Reg. 3002 (Tariff Comm'n 1961).
263 Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Wire Rods from France, 28 Fed. Reg. 7368 (Tariff
Comm'n 1963); Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Wire Rods from West Germany, 28 Fed. Reg.
6606 (Tariff Comm'n 1963); Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Wire Rods from Belgium, 28 Fed.
Reg. 6475 (Tariff Comm'n 1963).
264 35 Fed. Reg. 4161 (Tariff Comm'n 1970).
265 Id. at 4163 (Thunberg & Newsom, Comm'rs, dissenting).
266 Carbon Steel Bars & Shapes from Canada, 29 Fed. Reg. 12,599 (Tariff Comm'n
1964); Steel Reinforcing Bars from Canada, 29 Fed. Reg. 3840 (Tariff Comm'n 1964).
267 See Coudert, supra note 9, at 215-16. Coudert agrees with the dissenters that ap-
plication of the segmentation doctrine in these cases was inconsistent with a liberal trade
policy.
268 35 Fed. Reg. at 4162.
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most two, in the Washington-Oregon area, antidumping duties were
levied at all ports of entry in the country.
b. Material Injury. Whereas the Code requires injury to a domes-
tic industry or threat thereof to be material, the American statute merely
provides that the Tariff Commission "shall determine . . . whether an
industry in the United States is being or is likely to be injured.121 9
Despite the apparent difference in these provisions, there are strong
precedents supporting an interpretation of the American act to require
material or even anticompetitive injury. In recent decisions, however,
the Commission has applied a much more attenuated injury standard.
The contracting parties of GATT specified a material injury
standard in article VI of the 1947 agreement. Although article VI was
not strictly binding on the United States, the Treasury Department,
which then determined injury, nevertheless adopted the GATT lan-
guage as the proper interpretation of the American statute.270 At the
time of the inclusion of a "serious injury" test in the escape clause of
the 1951 Trade Agreements Extension Act,2 71 a legislative attempt was
made to amend the language of the dumping statute to require material
injury. Congress rejected this effort, but it did so, according to the
House Ways and Means Committee,
to avoid the possibility that the addition of the word "materially"
might be interpreted to require proof of a greater degree of injury
than is required under existing law for imposition of antidumping
duties. The committee decision is not intended to require imposi-
tion of antidumping duties upon a showing of frivolous, inconse-
quential, or immaterial injury.2 72
Since the Treasury had consistently testified that it interpreted the
"existing law" as requiring a "material injury" standard, congressional
inaction cannot be read as rejecting this interpretation. In later con-
gressional hearings on the question of transferring the injury determina-
tion to the Tariff Commission, the Commission's general counsel
explained that the "materiality" interpretation of the Treasury would
continue to be applied unless Congress gave specific statutory instruc-
tions to the contrary.27-
In its 1955 Cast Iron Soil Pipe from the United Kingdom deci-
209 Antidumping Act § 201(a), 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970).
270 See Hearings on H.R. 9476, at 35 (statement of Paul Kaplowitz, General Counsel,
Tariff Comm'n).
271 § 7(a), 65 Stat. 74.
272 H.R. REP. No. 1089, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1951).
273 See Hearings on H.R. 9476, at 35.
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sion274 the Commission seemed to contradict the general counsel's posi-
tion. The Commission applied an industry segmentation theory for the
first time in this case, and measured injury only in the West Coast
market area. Market intrusion even there amounted to only three
percent. The West Coast complainant was apparently a marginal pro-
ducer, whereas the domestic industry as a whole had experienced
increases in production, sales, capacity, and prices.
Eight years after the Soil Pipe decision, which was scathingly
criticized in legal writings and a congressional report,2 75 the Commission
returned to a material injury standard. Indeed in a number of cases it
embraced a full anticompetitive test of injury. In its 1963 investigation
of Titanium Dioxide from France,276 the Commission recalled its
general counsel's earlier policy statement before the House Ways and
Means Committee and asserted that only "material injury" would justify
an affirmative finding. GATT article VI was mentioned in a footnote,277
and the Commission based its construction on an unabashed antitrust
reading of the antidumping statute:
It is evident that Congress did not consider sales "at less than
fair value" as being malum per se; such sales are condemned in the
act only when they have an anticompetitive effect; and it is only then
that such sales may be equated with the concept of "unfair com-
petifion."78
The middle 1960's witnessed other Commission decisions, however,
which appeared to take a more quantitative, escape clause approach to
the statute. A series of quantitative factors were frequently cited, such as
market invasion, depressed prices, falling profits, unused capacity, and
unemployment.279 The first two, loss of customers and depressed prices,
received predominant consideration.280 However, since these factors
were generally required to be present in combination and since a
reasonable level of substantiality of all the factors was generally neces-
274 AA 1921-5, Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 5 (Oct. 27, 1955).
275 See Hearings on H.R. 6006, 6007 and 5120 Before House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 92-98 (1957); Kohn, supra note 9, at 418.
276 28 Fed. Reg. 10,467 (Tariff Conm'n 1963).
277 Id. at n.2.
278 Id. at 10,467; accord, Titanium Dioxide from West Germany, 81 Fed. Reg. 5852
(Tariff Comm'n 1966) (no injury); White Portland Cement from Japan, 29 Fed. Reg.
9686 (Tariff Comm'n 1964) (no injury); Chromic Acid from Australia, 29 Fed. Reg. 2919
(Tariff Comm'n 1964) (injury); Vital Wheat Gluten from Canada, 29 Fed. Reg. 1701 (Tariff
Comm'n 1964) (no injury).
279 See Baier, supra note 9, at 417-26.
280 See TAiE7 Comm'N CODE REPORT 15; Comment, supra note 9, at 710.
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sary, the quantitative and anticompetitive tests were not sharply diver-
gent.
Under the influence of changed and reduced membership the Com-
mission veered sharply away from these standards in its 1967 Soil Pipe
from Poland decision. 28' The Polish Soil Pipe case, a split 2-2 decision,
is reminiscent of the earlier Soil Pipe from the United Kingdom decision
in its narrow definition of market area and the insignificance of dumped
sales even in this smaller market: Polish soil pipe sales never rose above
four percent in the Northeast market area. But the rationale of the
decision is its most disturbing aspect. The majority opinion emasculated
the material injury concept by interpreting any greater than de minimis
injury to satisfy the injury test. Commissioner Clubb went even further
in a separate opinion and argued that the injury requirement had only
been inserted in the 1921 Act to avoid imposing on each customs
appraiser the burdensome task of inquiring into price discrimination on
every importation.21 2 Since Clubb would assess dumping duties when-
ever there is sufficient injury to justify the time and expense of an
investigation, he in effect espouses the strongly protectionist view that
price discrimination per se is an unfair trade practice.
The new de minimis test, at times supported by Clubb's question-
able interpretation of the legislative history of the Antidumping Act, has
been applied in major injury decisions since the Polish Soil Pipe
case. 28 3 A number of the affirmative post-Code decisions involve small
281 32 Fed. Reg. 12,925 (Tariff Comm'n 1967). When the Polish Soil Pipe case was
decided there were only four members on what is ordinarily a six-man Commission.
282 32 Fed. Reg. at 12,927. There is indeed some support for Clubb's view in the
legislative history. See S. REPx,. No. 16, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1921); Hearings on HR.
2435 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 36-42 (1931). In my view,
however, the legislative history of the 1921 Antidumping Act is too confused for such
conclusive assertions. See notes 206-14 and accompanying text supra. Indeed, there are
specific elements in the history which contradict Clubb's theory. The injury require-
ment was dearly viewed by some Senators as a standard for determining predatory
dumping, not as a device to protect overburdened customs appraisers. See 61 CONG. REC.
1101 (1921) (remarks of Senators Simmons and Watson). Moreover, concern with over-
burdening customs appraisers, if it existed at all on the part of other Senators, could
hardly have been very strong in view of the withholding of appraisement provision added
to the final form of the antidumping statute as it emerged from the conference committee.
That provision directed each local appraiser to make the very price discrimination
determination on each imported product which, in Clubb's view, the injury provision was
inserted to avoid. Antidumping Act § 201(b), amended, Customs Simplification Act of
1954, ch. 1213, § 301, 68 Stat. 1139, 19 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970) (transferring the withholding
investigation from the local appraiser to the Secretary of the Treasury). See 61 CONG. REc.
1563 (1921) (conference committee report).
283 Ferrite Cores from Japan, 36 Fed. Reg. 1934 (Tariff Comm'n 1971); Glass from
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to miniscule market invasion, depending on how the product market is
defined, and domestic profit and capacity utilization figures proceeding
in a contradictory steady or upward direction.28 4 Although in pre-Code
periods a positive determination was generally based on both substantial
market invasion and depressed prices, 28 5 a number of injury findings
have recently been made on the basis of a declining price structure
alone.28 6 The threshold of required market invasion, which was de-
termined in an exhaustive pre-Code study to be a none too high mini-
mum of seven percent, 287 was pushed to below two precent in the
recent Glass from Japan determination, 288 and even lower in Ferrite
Cores from Japan.289
Whole Dried Eggs from Holland290 is an instructive case. Imports
of Dutch whole dried eggs used in the baking and noodle industries
first began in 1966, and at that time represented one percent of the
American market. Sales rose to three percent in 1967 and 1968, while
total United States consumption increased substantially. When total
consumption fell in 1969, imported Dutch eggs accounted for seven
percent of the market. The Commission's opinion does not indicate
that all of the imports were sold at "less than fair value," and does
not disclose any further evidence of injury beyond the seven percent
figure for market intrusion. The majority291 stated that it was satisfied
Japan, 36 Fed. Reg. 7330 (Tariff Comm'n 1971); Pig Iron from Canada, Finland & West
Germany, 86 Fed. Reg. 11,835 (Tariff Comm'n 1971); Steel Bars, Reinforcing Bars &
Shapes from Australia, 35 Fed. Reg. 4161 (Tariff Comm'n 1970); Whole Dried Eggs from
Holland, 35 Fed. Reg. 12,500 (Tariff Comm'n 1970); Potassium Chloride from Canada,
France & West Germany, 34 Fed. Reg. 19,003 (Tariff Comm'n 1969); Pig Iron from East
Germany, Czechoslovakia, Romania & the U.S.S.R., 38 Fed. Reg. 14,664 (Tariff Comm'n
1968); Titanium Sponge from the U.S.S.R., 33 Fed. Reg. 10,769 (Tariff Comm'n 1968)
(Commission began investigation before the effective date of the Code-July 1, 1968).
It should be noted that Commissioner Clubb left the Tariff Commission at the
expiration of his term in the summer of 1971. In the injury decisions rendered since then
the Commission has not mentioned Clubb's theory of de minimis injury; nevertheless,
the substance of the decisions indicates a continued adherence to an attenuated test of
injury. See, e.g., Tempered Glass from Japan, 36 Fed. Reg. 14,682 (Aug. 1971); Clear
Sheet Glass from Taiwan, 36 Fed. Reg. 13,869 (July 1971).
284 See, e.g., Pig Iron from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Romania & the U.S.S.R.,
33 Fed. Reg. 14,664 (Tariff Comm'n 1968) (capacity utilization at its peak during largest
amount of dumping sales and profits showed little variation).
285 Note 279 supra.
286 See, e.g., Ferrite Cores from Japan, 86 Fed. Reg. 1934 (Tariff Comm'n 1971);
Glass from Japan, 86 Fed. Reg. 7330 (Tariff Comm'n 1971).
287 Baier, supra note 9, at 422.
288 86 Fed. Reg. at 7331.
289 36 Fed. Reg. at 1935.
290 35 Fed. Reg. 12,500 (Tariff Comm'n 1970).
291 Like Polish Soil Pipe, Dried Eggs involved a split decision with two commis-
sioners comprising a majority.
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with "a showing of anything more than a trivial or inconsequential
effect on the domestic industry."292
Even under such a startling test, however, the injury conclusion in
this case is difficult to comprehend. The price trend of domestic and
imported dried eggs during 1968 and 1969, when imports were at a
peak, was sharply upward. There was no reported evidence of lower
profits, unemployment, or reduced capacity among domestic com-
petitors. The evidence indicated that the Dutch eggs had not been in
any way injurious to the domestic price of whole dried eggs and some
evidence indicated that the complaining firm had been unable to fill
all of its orders for whole dried eggs in the past. The Dutch eggs were
apparently of a lower quality, and hence because of a lower demand for
them, were sold at prices slightly below the American product. Even
this lower price was apparently above the prevailing world price for
dried eggs of similar kind and quality.293
c. Causality. The high causality standard of the Code is potentially
its most far-reaching aspect. There are no exact parallels in pre-Code
American antidumping decisions to the Code requirement that
"dumped imports . .. [must be] demonstrably the principal cause of
material injury."294 The Antidumping Act merely instructs the Com-
mission to determine "whether an industry in the United States is
being or is likely to be injured.., by reason of the importation of such
merchandise." 295
The closest parallel to the principal cause standard is found in the
Commission's pre-Code escape clause decisions. Prior to the 1962 Trade
Expansion Act the escape clause had required a showing that increased
imports resulting from trade concessions "have contributed substantially
towards causing or threatening serious injury."290 That standard was
difficult but not impossible to satisfy.297 It had been interpreted by the
Tariff Commission to mean that increased imports must contribute to
the requisite injury more than any other single factor.29 8 For the appar-
ent purpose of reducing the availability of escape clause relief, the Trade
292 35 Fed. Reg. at 12,501.
293 In addition, the higher price in The Netherlands can probably be attributed
to the high support prices established under the common agricultural policy of the
EEC.
294 Code art. 8(a).
295 Antidumping Act § 201(a), 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
290 Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955, ch. 169, § 6(a), 69 Stat. 166, amending
ch. 141, § 7(b), 65 Stat. 74 (1951 Extension Act). This provision has been repealed by
TEA §§ 301(b)(1), (3), 76 Stat. 884, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1901(b)(1), (8) (1970).
297 See Banner, supra note 85; Davis, supra note 9, at 1482.
298 See Banner, supra note 85, at 1886-87.
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Expansion Act introduced a dual causality test: increased imports must
be caused "in major part" by trade agreement concessions, and they
must be "the major factor" in causing injury to the relevant domestic
industry.299 In a line of decisions under the 1962 Act the Tariff Com-
mission at times interpreted the new "major part" language to mean
that trade concessions must be a greater cause of increased imports
than the aggregate of all other possible causes.8°° It would not be
difficult to read this interpretation into the "principal cause"
language of the Antidumping Code, which urges that dumping should
be weighed against "all other factors taken together which may be
adversely affecting the industry."101
Until recently no petitioner for escape clause or adjustment as-
sistance relief 02 had been able to meet the new causality test of the
1962 Trade Expansion Act8 °3 It could thus be objected that the
standard is too high and therefore inappropriate for the antidumping
law.804 On the other hand, the conscious policy of the 1962 Act was to
avoid resort to industrywide tariff protection where less than a full
national industry has suffered injury. For this reason the adjustment
assistance program was introduced to provide individualized assistance
to particular firms and groups of workers.3 05 The Antidumping Act
affords a strong parallel to this situation because it also inappropriately
utilizes nationwide tariff sanctions where, because of the tendency
toward regionalized markets, injury is actually less than nationwide.
299 TEA §§ 301(b)(1), (8), 19 U.S.C. §§ 1901(b)(1), (3) (1970).
300 See, e.g., National Tile & Mfg. Co., TEA-F-5, Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 145, at 13
(Dec. 21, 1964); Softwood Lumber, TEA-I4, Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 79 (Feb. 14, 1963).
This development under the escape clause provisions of the Trade Expansion Act
is discussed in Metzger, supra note 85, at 869 n.73 (former Tariff Comm'n Chairman);
Note, supra note 14, at 1434-35; see also Banner, supra note 85.
301 Code art. 8(a).
802 See TEA §§ 318-18, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1918-18 (1970).
803 See Banner, supra note 85. The Tariff Commission made no affirmative decisions
from 1962 to 1969. See Note, supra note 14, at 1482. Recently, however, the Commission
appeared to abandon the preponderance test in several affirmative findings. Pianos &
Parts, Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 809 (Dec. 23, 1969); Buttweld Pipe & Tubing, Tariff
Comm'n Pub. No. 297 (Nov. 3, 1969); Transmission Towers, Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 298
(Nov. 3, 1969). See Note, Adjustment Assistance Under the Trade Expansion Act: A
Critique of Recent Tariff Commission Decisions, 6 TEXAS INT'L L.F. 67 (1970).
Although the preponderance test may have been abandoned, it seems clear that a
negative finding in either tariff adjustment or adjustment assistance cases may still be
based on a failure to meet the major part test. See Men's & Boy's Shirts, Tariff Comm'n
Pub. No. 489 (Nov. 26, 1971) (adjustment assistance); Nonrubber Footwear, Tariff Comm'n
Pub. No. 859 (Jan. 15, 1971) (tariff adjustment); Note supra note 14, at 1432 n.81.
304 See 118 CONG. REg. 27,089 (1967) (remarks of Senator Hartke).
305 See S. MxrzcER, TRADE AGREEmENTS AND THE KENNEDY ROUND (1964); Banner,
supra note 85, at 1356; Note, supra note 14, at 1431-32.
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Moreover, on an antitrust theory of dumping action an even firmer
causal nexus should be required to support an injury finding than
under the plainly protectionist escape clause.
The language of the Code, however, may yield to a more modest
interpretation. "Principal cause" need not necessarily mean "major
part" or "major factor."30 6 Rather it could be construed to be the rough
equivalent of the former "contributed substantially towards causing"
language of the escape clause. Under this standard the injurious effect
of dumping would merely have to outweigh that of any other single
factor. 07
In its latest post-Code decisions, however, the Commission has
rejected both an anticompetitive and an escape clause approach to the
causality question. It has adopted instead a highly attentuated "con-
tributing cause" theory, which virtually eliminates the causality issue.
The new causality test was foreshadowed by the Commission's
adoption of the cumulation doctrine in Pig Iron from East Germany,
Czechoslovakia, Romania & the U.S.S.R.M8 Here for the first time
the Commission measured injury by cumulating the injurious effect of
dumped pig iron from each of the East European countries involved and
from the Soviet Union. In the 1963 Steel Wire Rod cases,309 where
imports originated in Belgium, Luxemburg, France, and West Germany,
the Commission had adopted an opposite approach and had measured
the impact of dumped goods from each country separately.
306 See 113 CONG. RFec. 27,091 (1967) (remarks of Senator Javits).
807 In an attempt to ease the standard of causality in adjustment assistance cases,
Senator Hartke introduced S. 1333, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). That bill would have
changed the "major factor" language to "predominant factor." In explaining the intended
meaning of the new language, Senator Hartke said:
Increased imports would be the predominant factor in those cases where
the Tariff Commission finds that they are a more important factor than any
other single cause. It will not be necessary that they be more important than
all the other factors combined.
111 CONG. RFc. 3742 (1965). The "principle cause" terminology of the Code could easily
be likened to this interpretation of "predominant factor." See also 29 C.F.R. § 1801.2()
(1971), defining "primary factor" in adjustment assistance cases under the Canadian-
American Automotive Agreement to mean "a factor which is greater in importance than
any other single factor... but which does not have to be greater than any combination
of other factors."
308 33 Fed. Reg. 14,664 (Tariff Comm'n 1968).
a09 Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Wire Rods from France, 28 Fed. Reg. 7368 (Tariff
Comm'n 1963); Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Wire Rods from West Germany, 28 Fed. Reg.
6606 (Tariff Comm'n 1963); Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Wire Rods from Luxemburg, 28
Fed. Reg. 6476 (Tariff Comm'n 1963); Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Wire Rods from Belgium,
28 Fed. Reg. 6475 (Tariff Conm'n 1963).
The majority in Pig Iron argued these earlier cases could be read as having found
no injury even if aggregate effects were considered. 33 Fed. Reg. at 14,665.
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On an anticompetitive theory of dumping injury, the cumulation
doctrine is troublesome because it does not rest on collusive or inter-
dependent behavior. As long as the different national dumpers are
competitive with one another, there should be no reason to complain
of unfair anticompetitive practices. Only if there were evidence of
collusion might it be feared that the dumpers could gain control of the
market as a group.3 10
The Pig Iron cumulation doctrine clearly laid the foundation for
a causation theory requiring mere contribution to injury on the part
of dumped imports. If injury caused by nationally separate, noncol-
lusively dumped goods could be cumulated, what was to prevent ag-
gregating dumping injury with harmful business effects caused by
nondumped imports or even domestic business conditions?
The first statement of the new contributing cause standard appears
in the 1971 Ferrite Cores from Japan decision.8 1' The majority of three
Commissioners rejected the importer's argument, derived apparently
from the causality language of the Code, that injury should not be
found if attributable "primarily, if not solely, to factors other than
sales at LTFV'."312 Instead the majority asserted that "if injury is
attributable in part to the LTFV sales of the ferrite cores and such
injury is more than de minimis, we must make an affirmative de-
termination. The relative importance of such injury to injuries caused
by other factors is irrelevant." 313
The dissent pointed out that the decline in demand for ferrite cores
because of other causes was the major reason, perhaps the sole reason, for
falling prices in the industry. After the cessation of ferrite core imports
in 1967, domestic prices for cores continued to decline. Market invasion
by all ferrite core imports, only part of which were sold at "less than
fair value," generally hovered around the one percent level, with a
slight and temporary bulge to four percent in 1967.314
In Pig Iron from Canada, Finland & West Germany,31 5 the Com-
310 The decision is nevertheless arguably supported by the language of the Anti-
dumping Act, since the Act calls for the prevention of injury to "an industry in the
United States." 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970). Thus if unrelated foreign competitors fully
replaced American producers without lessening the general level of domestic competitive
rivalry, it might be argued that an "American industry" would still have been injured.
But it is difficult to explain why dumped goods should not be allowed to eliminate an
American industry, while uniformly low priced imports would face no such bar.
311 36 Fed. Reg. 1934 (Tariff Comm'n 1971).
812 Id.
313 Id. (emphasis added).
314 Id. at 1986.
315 36 Fed. Reg. 11,835 (Tariff Comm'n 1971).
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mission completed the circle by combining a cumulation test with the
new contributing cause standard. Even after aggregating the separate
pig iron imports from Canada, Finland, and West Germany, percentage
market invasion was apparently too minimal to be mentioned. The
Commission merely asserted that "the effect of the LTFV imports was
to displace some of the domestically produced cold pig iron."3 1
The majority admitted that depressed prices of domestic pig iron could
be attributed to technological changes in the steel industry, to low prices
for scrap metal, and to low prices of imported pig iron in general. None
of these considerations, however, was an obstacle to an injury finding
under the diluted standard enunciated: "it is not necessary to show that
imports were the sole cause nor even the major cause of injury as long
as the facts show that LTFV imports were more than a de minimis factor
in contributing to the injury."317 A causality test of this kind, especially
when combined with the de minimis injury theory, will surely bar all
price discrimination in international trade.
d. Insensitivity to Procompetitive Factors. On a separate ground
not involving a strict violation of Code standards one can also object to
some of the Commission's recent decisions, namely because they display
a thorough insensitivity to the procompetitive aspects of dumping
sales. In Potassium Chloride from Canada, France & West Germany,81
for example, the Commission refused to consider what seemed to be
a clear case of meeting American competition by French and West
German potash producers. In an attempt to retain their traditionally
small part of the East Coast potash market, French and German pro-
ducers cut their prices to follow the generally plummeting price struc-
ture in the American market caused by general oversupply. These
same conditions were not present in Europe, where prices remained
higher. Under the Commission's interpretation the French and West
Germans were forced either to cut their European prices to avoid price
discrimination, or to withdraw from the American market and thus
lessen competitive rivalry on the East Coast.
This decision's insensitivity to the value of price competition is
underscored by its treatment of the multinational corporation issue.
Eighty-five to ninety percent of the potash imports in question came
from Canada and were produced by four American firms with plants
in the United States and Canada. Only three of the ten American potash
producers did not have some link with the Canadian market. Although
810 Id. (emphasis added).
817 Id. at 11,835-36 (emphasis added).
318 34 Fed. Reg. 19,003 (Tariff Conm'n 1969).
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the price in the Canadian market was higher, Canadian sales of potash
were apparently insignificant. The lower American prices were the
result of stiff competition among the American producers in the face
of general oversupply. In a concurring opinion Commissioners Clubb
and Moore argued that the Antidumping Act was designed to protect
American labor as well as producers; hence it was legitimate to con-
sider fictional injury to the parent by imports from the subsidiary. 19
This view seems to ascribe to the Act the purpose of discouraging Amer-
ican firms from locating abroad-a characteristic of a protectionist
tariff. With an eye to competitive effects one might legitimately have
asked whether American firms were using monopoly profits abroad as
a lever with which to dominate the American market. But as a general
rule, increased investment by American firms abroad increases compe-
tion in the foreign market and thus reduces foreign market power. In
this case, of course, the differentially low prices charged by the Canadian
plants merely reflected the competitive conditions in the United States.
The American firms apparently located production units in Canada
because of ore deposits there.
In Bars & Shapes from Australi 20 injury was found despite the
Commission's apparent understanding that only sporadic dumping sales
were involved. The Australian producer disposed of surplus production
in various world markets, wherever he could obtain the most favorable
price. Anticompetitive motives and effects were not considered.
Moreover, in an increasing number of cases the Commission has
begun to measure injury on the basis of price depression alone.3 21 With-
out inquiry as to the trend of corporate profits, utilization of capacity,
the number and size of competitors involved, or the existence of possible
oligopolistic price discipline in the American market, injury findings
have been based solely on falling domestic prices as if this were an in-
controvertible evil under all circumstances.
CONCLUSION
I have argued that antidumping laws should be interpreted to pro.
hibit only anticompetitive dumping in international trade. I based this
position heavily on an economic analysis of dumping, free trade theory,
319 Id. at 19,007-08.
820 35 Fed. Reg. 4163 (Tariff Comm'n 1970).
321 See, e.g., Ferrite Cores from Japan, 86 Fed. Reg. 1934 (Tariff Comm'n 1971);
Glass from Japan, 36 Fed. Reg. 7830 (Tariff Comm'n 1971).
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and antitrust policy. Although the legislative history of the Antidump-
ing Act of 1921 is confused and indecisive, there is at least as much
authority for as there is against this view. There is also supportive prece-
dent in the somewhat erratic decisions of the Tariff Commission, which
have wavered between an antitrust and an escape clause view of the Act.
The most recent decisions of the Tariff Commission represent a de-
parture from these general standards, in open conflict with the Inter-
national Antidumping Code.
The Code takes a compromise stance between an antitrust and an
escape clause approach to the dumping question, one rather more
heavily weighted towards the latter than the former. It constitutes a dear
attempt to curb the protectionist potential inherent in the administra-
tive and substantive provisions of antidumping legislation. With the
exception of the United States it has been accepted and implemented
in good faith by the major Western trading nations and Japan.
I have argued that the Renegotiation Amendments Act of 1968
would not prevent interpreting the United States antidumping statute
in accordance with the Code guidelines. Indeed, the Treasury Regula-
tions of 1968 provide illustrative proof of this proposition. If it is ac-
cepted that the Act has a strong antitrust policy core, or at a minimum
that it should be interpreted as roughly consistent with escape clause
principles, the present Tariff Commission position is not only incon-
sistent with the Code, but with the Act as well.
Any careful consideration of antidumping laws inevitably raises
doubts about the need for such legislation at all, especially in a devel-
oped country like the United States, with its bulging armory of antitrust
laws. It seems fair to say that dumping has not proved to be the threat
anticipated at the turn of the century or during the interwar years. The
Robinson-Patman and Sherman Acts in particular give ample protection
against predatory practices, even in incipient stages, and there seems
little reason from a free trade perspective to demand greater protection
or different standards where international as opposed to domestic price
discrimination is at issue. Both of these antitrust laws may be enforced
against local importers or nonresident foreigners.8 22
For the present, however, the international trading community has
accepted the enforcement of antidumping laws within the confines of
322 See, e.g., United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504
(S.D.N.Y. 1951) (Sherman Act). No cases have been brought against foreigners under the
Robinson-Patman Act, but the statutory language appears applicable. See F. RowE,
supra note 31, at 81-83. On the questions of process and personal jurisdiction, see id.
at 81 n.153; Comment, supra note 9, at 723-24.
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the International Antidumping Code. Continued adherence by the
Tariff Commission to its present anti-Code posture8 23 threatens to en-
ervate the force of the Code and encourage retaliatory application of
the antidumping laws of other countries. This would spell the defeat
of a major, forward looking effort to control a non-tariff barrier to trade
through international agreement.
323 In the summer of 1971 two new members, Catherine Bedell and Joseph Parker,
joined the Commission as Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively. If Chairman Bedell
and Vice-Chairman Parker both adopt a pro-Code view, or if one does, and Commissioner
Sutton, whose term expires in the summer of 1972, is replaced by a pro-Code appointee,
the Commission's decisions may become less antagonistic towards the Code's injury
standards. The most recent Commission decisions in which both new Commissioners have
participated are, however, unpromising. See Sheet Glass from France, Italy & West
Germany, 36 Fed. Reg. 21, 432 (1971) (3-3 decision: Chairman Bedell found injury, Vice-
Chairman Parker did not; the Antidumping Act calls for an injury finding on tie votes
(19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970)); Ice Cream Sandwich Wafers from Canada, 37 Fed. Reg. 2817
(Tariff Comm'n 1972) (4-2 injury decision: Chairman Bedell and Vice-Chairman Parker
found injury); Diamond Tips from the United Kingdom, 37 Fed. Reg. 3932 (Tariff
Comm'n 1972) (unanimous injury decision).
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